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GOOD DEFICITS: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST FROM DEFICIT HYSTERIA 
Neil H. Buchanan
*
 
President Obama has come under increasingly fierce criticism for the 
size of the federal budget deficit, as both Democratic and Republican 
politicians loudly proclaim that federal spending should be cut. This article 
explains why such anti-deficit fervor is misguided and simplistic, and why, 
perhaps counter-intuitively, cutting government spending can hurt the 
country, rather than help it, in both the short run and the long run. 
In the short run, cutting deficit spending can be disastrous for the 
economy, especially if the economy is already in a weakened state (as the 
U.S. economy has been since 2008). In addition, the federal budget fails to 
separate spending that provides long-term benefits to the economy — such 
as spending on education and infrastructure — from spending that provides 
no long-term benefits. It is, therefore, just as politically expedient to cut 
valuable spending as it is to cut waste: both types of spending cuts reduce 
“the deficit.” Thus, indiscriminate cuts in government spending will reduce 
the deficit, but will also harm our long-term prospects. 
This article proposes a novel solution to this problem: the creation of 
an independent agency to fix the current incoherent and damaging 
budgeting process. The proposed “Growth Budgeting Board” could 
eliminate poorly timed and poorly targeted spending cuts, protect valuable 
investments from the budget ax, and discipline the budgeting process to 
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reduce the opportunities for political gamesmanship and abuse. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
―Cutting the deficit by gutting our investments in innovation and 
education is like lightening an overloaded airplane by removing its engine. 
It may make you feel like you‘re flying high at first, but it won‘t take long 
before you feel the impact.‖ 
— President Barack Obama, The State of the Union Address, 20111 
―All of this new government spending was sold as ‗investment.‘ Yet 
after two years, the unemployment rate remains above 9% and government 
has added over $3 trillion to our debt.‖ 
— U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan, Official Republican Response to the State of 
the Union Address, 2011
2
 
Spending by the federal government — even spending that is financed 
by deficits — can improve both short-term and long-term living standards 
for the citizens of the United States. This basic truth has not, unfortunately, 
stopped the U.S. political system from becoming paralyzed by a fear of 
deficit spending. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that federal deficits 
were the defining issue of the first two years of Barack Obama‘s 
presidency, and federal budgeting issues have become an even more 
fiercely contested political battleground in the 112
th
 Congress. 
This is hardly the first time that deficits have become such a central 
concern for policymakers, of course. The current environment, however, is 
 
 
1
 Office of the Press Sec‘y, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/    
remarks-president-state-union-address. 
 
2
 Transcript: GOP Response From Rep. Paul Ryan, NAT‘L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 25, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133227396/transcript-gop-response-from-rep-paul-     
ryan. 
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especially toxic, with the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression leading to extreme levels of economic pain and fear.
3
 Budget 
deficits are little more than an abstraction to most people, and unimaginably 
large dollar figures seem to validate suspicions that something big and bad 
must be going on. When combined with personal intuitions that borrowing 
money must somehow be a mark of shame, it is precisely the abstract nature 
of deficits that makes people fear and misunderstand them. Even anti-deficit 
policies that will harm the economy can be embraced by millions of scared 
and uncertain citizens. 
The public‘s fear has, unsurprisingly, found a voice among the nation‘s 
politicians. One Republican U.S. Senator, for example, recently claimed in 
a floor debate that the current level of the federal deficit represents a 
―crisis‖ that threatens the country‘s security.
4
 A Democratic U.S. Senator 
cited Congress‘s failure ―to deal with one of the greatest threats facing our 
nation: our exploding deficits and debt‖ as one of his major reasons for 
retiring in frustration from his office,
5
 and he listed deficit reduction first 
among the four problems that he would help the President try to solve 
during his remaining time in office.
6
 
The constant hyping of the supposed harms flowing from budget 
deficits has reached the point where being loudly critical of deficits seems 
to have become a badge of seriousness, notwithstanding any particular 
commentator‘s lack of expertise about economics. To note just one 
example, the journalist Fareed Zakaria, who has a well-earned reputation as 
a keen observer of foreign affairs, especially with regard to the wars in the 
Middle East, felt comfortable inveighing against deficits in a commentary 
early in 2010, even though it is far from his area of expertise. Criticizing 
two prominent policymakers for failing to advocate a policy that would 
address ―the black hole that is the federal budget deficit,‖
7
 Zakaria 
 
 
3
 See Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, 
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=   
aNivTjr852TI. 
 
4
 Floyd Norris, Rates Fall as Market Fears Economic Weakness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
15, 2010 (―Deficit hawks are leaning forward in the United States as well. ‗Many Americans 
and most senators feel that the level of the federal debt is at crisis levels,‘ Senator Lamar 
Alexander, a Tennessee Republican, said in a Senate debate last month, adding that the debt 
‗threatens the security of our country.‘‖). 
 
5
 Press Release, Bayh Announces He Will Not Seek a Third Senate Term (Feb. 15, 
2010), available at http://www.swiahu.org/images/PDF/Bayh%20Email.pdf. 
 
6
 Id. (listing deficit reduction first, followed by ―[getting] the economy moving 
again,‖ financial reform, and educational reform). 
 
7
 Transcript, Fareed Zakaria GPS: Interview with Paul Volcker, CNN (Feb. 14, 
2010), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1002/14/fzgps.01.html. 
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concluded: ―For shame.‖
8
 While many people might find it odd if an 
economist were to weigh in on the wisdom of, say, the U.S. military‘s 
withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan, there seems to be little resistance to 
the idea that anyone with a microphone is qualified to denounce deficit 
spending. 
Predictably, this constant denunciation of deficits feeds back into 
public opinion polls, with the public repeating what they have heard about 
the dangers of continued budget deficits. Polls show that large numbers of 
people continue to worry about budget deficits.
9
 For example, a poll in 
January 2010 showed over 80% of those interviewed describing themselves 
as either ―very worried‖ or ―somewhat worried‖ that ―increasing federal 
debt will harm the financial future of your children and grandchildren,‖
10
 
while 85% were either ―angry‖ or ―bothered, but not angry‖ about ―the 
growing federal budget deficit.‖
11
 
The drumbeat against deficit spending can be heard everywhere, not 
just among the public and politicians, but among many policy 
commentators as well.
12
 Some commentators, in their zeal to advance 
policies to reduce deficits, twist the results of public opinion polls. For 
example, a poll that showed 14% of Americans identifying the deficit as 
―the largest problem the country will face‖ in twenty-five years was 
inaccurately (or at least misleadingly) described as showing that 
―Americans Believe Deficit is Largest Looming Problem.‖
13
 
 
 
8
 Id. 
 
9
 Summing Up Public Opinion on Federal Debt and Deficits, PUB. AGENDA (Feb. 25, 
2010), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/SummingUpPublicOpinionOn    
DebtAndDeficits.pdf. 
 
10
 Id. at 2. 
 
11
 Id. 
 
12
 One of the D.C.-based think tanks that has been especially active in promoting the 
idea that deficits are an enormous, pressing problem is the Committee for a Responsible 
Federal Budget. This private group of former members of Congress and high-level budget 
officials from both parties issues ongoing commentary to support its overall claim that the 
U.S. fiscal situation must be changed — and changed quickly — through some combination 
of cuts in spending and increases in taxes. Because of the pedigrees of the members of that 
committee, and because it produces such a large amount of material warning against deficits, 
its analyses are an especially useful source for those who wish to find the more sophisticated 
versions of anti-deficit arguments. See generally THE COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE 
FEDERAL BUDGET, http://crfb.org/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
 
13
 Americans Believe Deficit is Largest Looming Problem, THE COMMITTEE FOR A 
RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET (Mar. 16, 2010), http://crfb.org/blogs/americans-believe-
deficit-largest-looming-problem. The poll merely showed that more people — one in seven 
respondents — named the federal deficit as the biggest problem likely to face the country in 
twenty-five years. It did not show that Americans as a whole, or even a simple majority, 
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Even in this atmosphere of misinformation and crisis, however, it is 
possible to find sensible, sober analyses of deficits, with some editorialists 
attempting to put the risks and tradeoffs of deficits in some perspective.
14
 
Most prominent economists, moreover, generally agree that any problem 
with deficits is not a matter of the deficits that are being incurred in the 
midst of the current ―Great Recession‖ but is, at most, a long-term 
problem.
15
 As two highly regarded economists recently put it: ―Today‘s 
debt problems result not from how fiscal policy was managed during the 
crisis, but from how it was mismanaged before the crisis.‖
16
 Another 
prominent economist described the hype surrounding budget deficits as 
―scare tactics,‖
17
 drawing a pointed analogy to the hype surrounding the 
build-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
18
 
Even so, because the overall atmosphere in public discussions 
continues to be so stridently anti-deficit, President Obama has responded to 
the public‘s fears with gestures that are intended to suggest that he is taking 
action, but that instead tend to validate those fears. For example, early in 
 
believe that to be true. 
 
14
 See, e.g., Editorial  ¸ What They‟re Not Telling You, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2010 
(―There is a lot of heated talk in Washington these days about the deficit, unfortunately little 
of it serious.‖). 
 
15
 For some contrary views, see infra note 77. The most extreme theoretical claim 
against the standard view of deficit spending during recessions is the (misnamed) concept of 
―Ricardian Equivalence,‖ which predicts that government spending is perfectly offset by 
rational taxpayers, who save dollar-for-dollar the amount of any increase in government 
spending, in anticipation of future tax increases. See, e.g., Brad DeLong, An Appeal for 
Help: Recent History of Economic Thought, BRAD DELONG‘S GRASPING REALITY WITH ALL 
TEN TENTACLES, Apr. 5, 2009, http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/04/an-appeal-for-help- 
recent-history-of-economic-thought.html (professor in Berkeley‘s Economics Department 
saying that ―Ricardian equivalence means not just that deficit-financed tax cuts have no 
short-term stimulative effects but also that deficit-financed spending increases have no short-
term stimulative effects on nominal spending,‖ and describing that claim as ―false‖). 
 
16
 Olivier Blanchard & Carlo Cottarelli, The Great False Choice, Stimulus or 
Austerity, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010 (chief economist and head of fiscal affairs at the IMF 
arguing that long-term fiscal changes in most countries are much more important ―than if the 
world gets 2011 plans wrong by a fraction of a percent of GDP‖). 
 
17
 Paul Krugman, Fiscal Scare Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A25 (―The deficit 
threatens economic recovery, we‘re told; it puts American economic stability at risk; it will 
undermine our influence in the world. These claims generally aren‘t stated as opinions, as 
views held by some analysts but disputed by others. Instead, they‘re reported as if they were 
facts, plain and simple. Yet they aren‘t facts.‖). 
 
18
 Id. (―To me — and I‘m not alone in this — the sudden outbreak of deficit hysteria 
brings back memories of the groupthink that took hold during the run-up to the Iraq war. 
Now, as then, dubious allegations, not backed by hard evidence, are being reported as if they 
have been established beyond a shadow of a doubt.‖). 
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2010, the President proposed a freeze on federal spending in certain areas of 
the budget.
19
 More prominently, and perhaps of more ultimate 
consequence, the President issued an executive order creating a bipartisan 
commission to study the federal deficit and debt and to produce a report and 
recommendation after the 2010 mid-term elections.
20
 
In this atmosphere, the better response to public concerns about the 
deficit involves two steps. First, we need to clearly differentiate short-run 
changes in the deficit from long-run changes and guarantee that short-run 
policies will truly be limited to the short-run. This will allow policymakers 
to respond to recessions with appropriate levels and types of fiscal stimulus 
(i.e., ―good deficits‖), without fear of being told that it is unacceptable to 
add to ―the deficit.‖ Second, we need to remind ourselves that long-run 
deficits can also be good, so long as they are spent on projects that represent 
an investment in the nation‘s future productivity, and we need to put in 
place mechanisms that will increase the government‘s long-term 
investments in the economy. 
This article, while acknowledging the dangers of certain types and 
levels of federal deficit spending, describes the conditions under which 
deficit spending can be ―good‖ — that is, when deficits will improve the 
economy‘s performance and people‘s standards of living — in both the 
short-run and the long-run. Given the inability of the U.S. political system 
to deal with budget issues in a coherent manner — or even to understand 
them — I propose the adoption of an independent federal agency charged 
with providing essential guidance regarding government spending and 
 
 
19
 Lori Montgomery, Obama to Propose Freeze on Government Spending, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 26, 2010 (―Under mounting pressure to rein in mammoth budget deficits, 
President Obama will propose in his State of the Union address a three-year freeze on federal 
funding that is not related to national security, a concession to public concern about 
government spending that could dramatically curtail Obama‘s legislative ambitions.‖). Note 
the use of the loaded adjective ―mammoth‖ in what is supposed to be a news article, not an 
editorial. 
 
20
 Exec. Order NO. 13,531, 75 Fed. Reg. 7, 927 (Feb. 23, 2010), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-3725.pdf; see also Alex Kingsbury, Obama 
Creates a Commission to Shrink the Deficit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 22, 2010 
(―There‘s an old maxim in Washington that when politicians are either unable or unwilling 
to tackle a problem directly, they appoint a commission to give the issue more intensive 
study. So it was last week when President Obama created the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, a bipartisan group of 18 souls charged with solving 
perhaps the country‘s most vexing and pressing public-policy problem — red ink.‖). That 
commission‘s report was, indeed, issued shortly after the November 2010 elections. See THE 
NAT‘L COMM‘N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH (2010), 
available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/ 
TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. 
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taxation. Specifically, the agency — the ―Growth Budgeting Board‖ — 
would be empowered to identify those budgetary items (both spending 
programs and tax cuts) that could responsibly be financed through increases 
in the public debt. With such a board in place, it would be possible to stop 
making foolish decisions about spending — decisions that in the current 
environment are based on little more than intuition and superstition — and 
instead to allow policy to be based on clear understandings of how the 
deficit affects the economy, both now and in the future. 
II.  BUDGET DEFICITS: WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW BIG THEY SHOULD BE 
Studying the connections between fiscal deficits and economic 
prosperity is one of the foundational purposes of modern 
macroeconomics.
21
 As the discussion above demonstrates, there is a 
recurring focus within U.S. political and policy circles on reducing the 
federal government‘s budget deficit, a focus that has become especially 
intense in the last two years. The issue is usually presented as a matter of 
high national priority, often presented in moral terms and almost invariably 
described as a matter of protecting the country‘s long-term economic 
health.
22
 The idea is to force reluctant politicians to make ―tough choices‖ 
that might not be popular, but that are necessary for the good of the country, 
the economy, and ―our children and grandchildren.‖ What is usually 
missing from such calls for austerity, however, is any but the most casual 
explanation of why deficits matter, much less how to determine the 
appropriate level of the federal deficit. 
These issues are anything but simple. There are several competing 
candidates for the right way to measure deficits,
23
 and there is a dearth of 
positive guidance from macroeconomic theory to tell us what the deficit 
should be in any given year or over longer periods of time. There is, 
 
 
21
 See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Is the National Debt Really — I Mean, Really — a 
Burden?, in DEBT AND THE TWIN DEFICITS DEBATE 209, 219 (James M. Rock ed., 1991); 
Neil H. Buchanan, Is It Sometimes Good to Run Budget Deficits? If So, Should We Admit It 
(Out Loud)?, 26 VA. TAX REV. 325, 335–37 (2006) [hereinafter Buchanan, Sometimes 
Good?]. 
 
22
 See, e.g., Gray Rohrer, George LeMieux: We Can, We Must, Balance Federal 
Budget, SUNSHINE ST. NEWS, Aug.12, 2010, http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/   
george-lemieux-we-can-we-must-balance-federal-budget (reporting Robert Bixby‘s claim 
that the deficit is ―not a numbers issue, it‘s a moral issue‖). 
 
23
 See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy: Three Essays (1996) 
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University), ch. 1 [hereinafter Debt, Deficits, and 
Fiscal] (discussing thirteen different ways to measure government deficits — a discussion 
that did not purport to cover all of the possibilities). 
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however, some very important negative guidance from macroeconomic 
theory. That is, even though we do not know what the right answer is, we 
can rule out some widely believed wrong answers. In the end, however, 
several possible deficit targets are not obviously wrong, making the debate 
about ―responsible‖ budgets much more difficult than it might initially 
appear. 
A.  Measuring Deficits and Debt 
Before beginning to analyze the various approaches to government 
budget management, it is important to highlight the difference between 
deficits and debt. A deficit is the difference in a given time period (usually a 
year) between the amount of money that the federal government spends and 
the amount of money that it receives.
24
 (A negative deficit, with revenues 
exceeding expenditures, is called a surplus.) If the federal government runs 
a deficit in a given year, the U.S. Treasury finances that deficit by selling 
government securities to ―the public,‖ which includes all non-federal-
government entities,
25
 including private individuals, state and local 
governments, private corporations, financial institutions (pension funds, 
mutual funds, banks, etc.), and foreign governments. By contrast, the 
federal debt is the total amount of money that the federal government owes 
at a given time to those other entities, also called ―debt held by the 
public.‖
26
 The debt is thus the accumulated value, at any point in time, of 
all previous annual deficits (less previous annual surpluses), plus 
accumulated interest on the money borrowed. 
The deficit, therefore, is financed by an increase in the outstanding debt 
of the federal government. Entities lend money to the U.S. government by 
 
 
24
 This measure of the deficit is also called the ―cash-flow deficit,‖ because it simply 
measures the difference between money flowing into the government and money flowing out 
of the government during a given year. 
 
25
 For purposes of budget accounting, however, the Federal Reserve System is 
considered to be part of ―the public.‖ 
 
26
 The U.S. ―national debt‖ is typically expressed in two forms: as the total value of all 
Treasury securities that have been issued and not redeemed, or as the total value of the 
Treasury securities held outside of the federal government. Because federal agencies hold 
large amounts of securities issued by the U.S. Treasury — which is merely another federal 
agency — this internal accounting procedure is akin to merely keeping an IOU in one pocket 
that promises to transfer money at some point from another pocket. That is, the overall 
federal debt is not affected by these internal accounting procedures. On August 19, 2010, the 
total federal debt (including debt held internally by federal agencies) was $13.4 trillion, or 
92% of GDP; but the debt held by the public was $8.8 trillion, or 60% of GDP. See 
TREASURY DIRECT: THE DEBT TO THE PENNY AND WHO HOLDS IT, http://www.treasurydirect. 
gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited Aug. 21, 2010). 
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buying Treasury securities that legally obligate the federal government to 
repay the borrowed funds, with interest, at a specific date or dates in the 
future. These securities, often called ―Treasuries‖ because they are issued 
by the United States Department of the Treasury, carry the full faith and 
credit of the United States government. They are simply loan instruments, 
with a private party exchanging money today for the promise of money in 
the future. 
Understanding the fundamental difference between deficit and debt is 
necessary to understand even the most basic issues regarding fiscal 
budgeting. In addition, there are several important nuances regarding the 
measurement of deficits and debt.
27
 For example, it is essential not to 
discuss deficits and debt in dollar terms but as the percent of the nation‘s 
income that they represent. This is because richer borrowers are better 
positioned to repay any given amount of debt than poorer borrowers would 
be.
28
 For purposes of discussing government debt, the best measure of 
national income is the gross domestic product.
29
 This means, for example, 
that the $160.7 billion deficit in 2007 was much smaller than the $149.7 
billion deficit in 1987, because GDP was $13,896 billion in 2007 but only 
$4,651 billion in 1987, making the debt-to-GDP ratios in those years 1.2% 
 
 
27
 For a short discussion of the various issues discussed here, see Neil H. Buchanan, If 
We Must Obsess About Budget Deficits, Can We At Least Measure Them Correctly?, 
FINDLAW, Jan. 28, 2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/buchanan/20100128.html [hereinafter 
Buchanan, If We Must Obsess]. There is also a method of measuring deficits that focuses on 
aggregating all future deficits into a single number, rather than measuring deficits year by 
year. This is discussed and critiqued in Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational 
Justice, and Long-Term Deficits, 58 TAX L. REV. 275, 291 (2005) [hereinafter Buchanan, 
Long-Term Deficits]. The analysis herein will not further address issues related to that 
alternative measurement of national indebtedness. 
 
28
 U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS: AN UPDATE (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04485 
sp.pdf (―The amount of any borrower‘s debt by itself is not a good indicator of the burden 
imposed by that debt. A borrower‘s income and wealth are important in assessing the burden 
of debt. Therefore, to get a sense of the burden represented by the federal debt, that debt is 
often measured in relation to the nation‘s income.‖); see also Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, 
supra note 27, at 289–91. 
 
29
 There are various measures of an economy‘s annual income, but the most common 
measure is Gross Domestic Product, or GDP. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 28, at 7. (―Gross domestic product (GDP) is a commonly used measure of domestic 
national income. GDP is the value of all goods and services produced within the United 
States in a given year and is conceptually equivalent to incomes earned in production. It is a 
rough indicator of the economic earnings base from which the government draws its 
revenues.‖). 
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and 3.2% respectively.
30
 
While discussions of the U.S. budget deficit almost always focus on the 
federal government to the exclusion of state and local governments, there is 
no valid theoretical reason to separate the government‘s effects on the 
economy on the basis of our federal form of government. If the government 
spends, it does not matter for macroeconomic purposes whether that 
spending comes from a state, a city, or any other government entity.
31
 
Because states and cities currently face severe budget difficulties, their 
efforts to raise taxes and cut spending substantially offset some or all of the 
federal government‘s actions. For example, ―when the federal government 
was adding $234 billion in 2008 to the . . . deficit in order to fight the 
worsening recession, states were cutting $193 billion.‖
32
 The net difference 
was $41 billion, less than 0.3% of GDP, making the overall impact of the 
federal government‘s efforts to help the economy much smaller than they 
appeared. 
Most important, the federal deficit automatically rises when the 
economy shrinks, because as people lose jobs, they pay fewer dollars in 
taxes and receive more dollars in government assistance. The size of this 
effect can be substantial. For example, in 2009, when the federal deficit 
rose by $955 billion, or 6.7% of GDP, almost one-third of that change was 
due to the decline in revenues and increase in expenditures that 
accompanied the worsening recession.
33
 More generally, in the six 
recessions that preceded the current downturn, the deficit rose on average 
by 2.2% of GDP, but almost three-quarters of that amount (1.6%) was due 
to cyclical changes in the economy.
34
 
From the standpoint of deficit policy, therefore, it is essential during a 
recession for the government to take account of how much of the change in 
the deficit is due to the worsening economy. This is known as the 
―standardized employment deficit‖ or the ―cyclical deficit,‖ which measures 
 
 
30
 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: HISTORICAL BUDGET 
DATA, tbls. F-1, F-11, F-2 (2010), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/   
HistoricalTables.pdf. 
 
31
 See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 27, at 291. 
 
32
 Buchanan, If We Must Obsess, supra note 27. 
 
33
 Id. 
 
34
 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008 
TO 2018, app. at 129, box C-1, (2008), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8917/01- 
23-2008_BudgetOutlook.pdf. Note that the denominator for these percentages is ―potential 
GDP,‖ which is the level of GDP that would have been produced had the economy not been 
in a recession. 
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how large the deficit would have been but for the recession.
35
 In addition, 
any temporary spending that is incurred to fight the deficit, but that will not 
continue after the recession is over, must be separated from the rest of the 
deficit. Only if those two adjustments are made can spending and taxing 
policy be undertaken with a clear understanding of the various reasons that 
the deficit has risen during a recession. 
The current political environment fails to differentiate between deficits 
that are due to long-term imbalances, deficits that are due to short-term 
passive effects of the economy on spending and revenues, and deficits 
undertaken specifically to reverse an economic downturn on a temporary 
basis. In this article, I argue that it is essential to have a government agency 
to provide relevant guidance to Congress. 
B.  The Possible Harms of Fiscal Deficits 
As discussed above, there are a number of plausible methods to 
measure the official ―deficit‖ of the U.S. government, and the most 
commonly cited measure (the ―cash-flow deficit‖) is not a particularly 
strong one.
36
 Even so, the standard political debate in the U.S. takes as a 
given that the deficit is too high, and therefore that the level of government 
spending must be cut, or that taxes must be increased, or both. For some 
politicians, however, tax increases are off the table, for reasons that are not 
germane to this discussion.
37
 In any case, calls to bring the deficit (however 
measured) under control imply some combination of lower government 
spending and higher taxes. Before continuing, therefore, it is important to 
discuss the potential benefits of reducing deficits, that is, the arguments 
against deficits.
38
 
 
 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 Buchanan, If We Must Obsess, supra note 27. 
 
37
 See, e.g., David Edwards & Daniel Tencer, Sen. Kyl: $678-billion Tax Break for 
Rich Should not be Offset, THE RAW STORY (July 11, 2010), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/ 
2010/07/11/kyl-you-offset-tax-cuts/ (U.S. Senate Minority Whip arguing ―you should never 
raise taxes in order to cut taxes‖). In addition, some politicians continue to assert that tax 
cuts do not increase the deficit at all. See, e.g., Luke Johnson, Marco Rubio: Tax Cuts Pay 
for Themselves While Unemployment Benefits Don‟t, THE FLA. INDEP., July 20, 2010, 
http://floridaindependent.com/4319/marco-rubio-tax-cuts-pay-for-themselves-while- 
unemployment-benefits-don%E2%80%99t. Some readers will recognize this argument as 
the so-called Laffer Curve, which has been broadly rejected by the economics profession. 
See, e.g., Buchanan, Sometimes Good?, supra note 21, at 341 (quoting N. Gregory Mankiw 
as having ―ridiculed the supply-side tax policies of President Ronald Reagan as the work of 
‗charlatans and cranks.‘‖). 
 
38
 The harms from cutting deficits are discussed in Part III below. 
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1. Deficits, National Bankruptcy, and Inflation 
While there are, as noted above, many calls to reduce deficit spending 
that seem to flow from the unexamined belief that there is something 
intrinsically wrong with running deficits, there are a number of substantive 
claims about the harms of deficit spending that deserve scrutiny. While 
some of these concerns turn out to be baseless, they are at least attempts to 
put something behind the generalized hysteria against deficit spending. 
Other concerns are much more substantive; and while they do not support 
arguments to eliminate federal deficits, they do serve the important function 
of helping to determine the possible limits of budget deficits and the 
tradeoffs that reducing budget deficits would imply. 
The claim that the United States government will go ―bankrupt‖ if it 
continues to run deficits is — despite its repetition by opponents of deficits 
— simply incorrect as a technical matter.
39
 All Treasury securities are 
denominated in U.S. dollars, which means that the promises embodied in 
Treasuries can be honored so long as the United States Treasury has dollars 
with which to pay its debts. Given that the central bank of the United States, 
the Federal Reserve System (more commonly known simply as the Fed), 
has the power to create dollars, it is not possible for the federal government 
ever to run out of dollars. Treasury securities will always be repaid. 
The federal government‘s ability to create money means that there is 
no risk of default to a holder of a Treasury security. The borrowed money 
will be repaid, which is why financial institutions are willing to hold 
Treasuries as the equivalent of cash in their portfolios.
40
  Although such 
securities generally pay interest, the rates can be so low that the holders of 
Treasuries are investing their money for a virtually zero rate of return. This 
has been the case with very short-term Treasury securities for the last few 
years. The willingness of investors to hold Treasuries even without earning 
interest is testament to the confidence that investors have in the full faith 
and credit of the United States government. Investors are lending money to 
the government, and the only thing that they receive in return is the 
guarantee that the government will pay them back in full, in dollars. 
It is possible, of course, for the Fed to create so much money that it 
creates inflation. The risk of inflation is heightened when the economy is 
operating at full capacity, as well as by very large increases in the amount 
of money in circulation. While this danger is always present in a modern 
 
 
39
 The discussion in this section draws extensively on Blinder, supra note 21. 
 
40
 It is possible that the money that is repaid will not have the same buying power as 
the money that the lender expected, as discussed below. Inflation risk is, however, distinct 
from default risk. 
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economy, there is very little evidence that the Fed has ever come close to 
increasing the rate of inflation by creating too much money in response to 
the federal budget deficit. For example, during the Reagan administration, 
annual federal deficits were higher than at any time since World War II, yet 
the inflation rate fell from double-digit rates at the beginning of the 1980‘s 
and remained in the range of one to six percent for the rest of the decade.
41
 
Similarly, outstanding federal debt has increased to sixty percent of GDP 
during the Great Recession years of 2008 through 2010, yet there is no 
evidence of an emerging problem with inflation. Not only has there been no 
hyper-inflation or even accelerating rates of inflation, but the inflation rate 
is near zero and trending downward. If anything, the bigger worry is not 
inflation but deflation. 
Nonetheless, the risk of inflation does mean that there are prudential 
limits on deficit spending, with extraordinarily large deficits being a sure 
path to hyper-inflation. Unfortunately, the value (or even the range) of the 
upper limit on money growth is currently unknown.
42
 Any reasonable 
government would guard against such an outcome, but the U.S. experience 
suggests that there is minimal danger of even the current high levels of the 
budget deficit leading to excessive monetary growth and ultimately creating 
an increase in inflation. 
2. Deficits, Investment, and Future Prosperity 
While the risk of igniting inflation due to deficit spending is thankfully 
small, a more likely harm from deficit spending lies in a concept known as 
―crowding out.‖
43
 One of the fundamental insights motivating standard 
macroeconomic models is that, when a government buys or produces goods 
or services, it generally competes for resources with the private sector. 
When the government hires workers to build a dam, for example, those 
workers become unavailable to private contractors who might have used 
 
 
41
 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: DATABASES, TABLES, & CALCULATORS BY 
SUBJECT, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
 
42
 Needless to say, there is a large economic literature that attempts to identify the 
relationship between monetary expansion and inflation. The most that can currently be said 
is that monetary expansion can lead to inflation after a lag. On the other hand, the recent 
experience in which the Fed expanded one of its monetary control variables by historic 
margins, with no subsequent uptick in inflation, suggests that the relationship between 
monetary expansion and inflation is loose and imprecise. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, How 
is Money Created? Debunking Some Myths About Recent Policies to Stabilize the Financial 
System and the Economy, FINDLAW, June 18, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/buchanan/ 
20090618.html. 
 
43
 See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 27, at 311. 
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them to build a factory. A government‘s spending decisions, therefore, can 
prevent private businesses from investing in productive capital projects. 
The basic concern is that the federal government might reduce future 
living standards by reducing the private capital stock (factories, equipment, 
etc.) that will be available in future years to generate income for American 
business owners and their employees. This can happen when the federal 
government borrows money and then hires existing capital and workers to 
produce (either directly or indirectly) current consumption goods rather 
than capital goods for the future.
44
 The form of crowding out differs, 
depending upon whether deficits are financed with dollars borrowed from 
domestic or foreign sources; but no matter who finances the government‘s 
borrowing, the result under this theory is that the future incomes of 
American citizens will be lower than they would otherwise be.
45
 
As discussed in Sec. III.C. below, the crowding out story is 
considerably more complicated than the brief description here suggests. At 
this point, however, the important lesson is that deficits today can be 
harmful tomorrow, if they cause the capital stock to be lower than it would 
otherwise be. 
3. Deficits and the Risks of a Financial Crisis 
Finally, it is possible that U.S. deficits could become so large for so 
long that financial markets collectively would lose confidence in the 
country‘s fiscal position. Indeed, it is precisely this scary possibility that 
many commentators have invoked in recent years as a reason to reduce the 
U.S. fiscal deficit.
46
 The idea is that there is no telling when the financial 
 
 
44
 It is also possible for the government‘s borrowing to crowd out private consumption, 
rather than private investment. If it does, then there will be no reduction in future 
productivity or living standards, because private consumption is merely being replaced by 
government consumption (consumption that will ultimately benefit private individuals). The 
mix of consumption will thus change, but there will be no crowding out of the capital stock. 
 
45
 If the government‘s borrowing reduces the actual capital stock, then the future 
output of the economy will be lower than otherwise. If the government borrows from foreign 
sources, thus allowing domestic saving to be used to build the capital stock to the levels that 
it otherwise would have reached, then the interest on the debt to foreigners will, in essence, 
drain the increased future income that such capital would create. This means, in essence, that 
borrowing from abroad allows the U.S. to accumulate more capital, but that the income from 
that capital does not benefit domestic citizens. This is the equivalent of crowding out the 
capital stock directly. See generally Blinder, supra note 21. 
 
46
 See, e.g., Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Debt Crisis Looming; 
Political and Market Risks Run Large, COMM. RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET BLOG (May 6, 
2010), http://crfb.org/blogs/debt-crisis-looming-political-and-market-risks-run-large       
[hereinafter ―Debt Crisis Looming‖] (―Yesterday, The Committee for a Responsible Federal 
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markets will suddenly stop accepting trades in U.S. Treasury securities. 
Financial crises in other countries in the relatively recent past have been 
painful,
47
 and those crises arguably began without warning. If the U.S. 
government were to push its deficit to levels today and — much more 
important — in the future that would be viewed as unsustainable, then the 
resolution of that policy failure could be swift and harsh.
48
 
Although it is true that a fiscal crisis could erupt at any time, with the 
financial markets forcing a sudden policy adjustment to prevent projected 
future imbalances from coming into being,
49
 the consequences of long-term 
fiscal imbalance could instead be felt gradually, with deficits reducing 
living standards over the space of years or decades. Large predicted deficits 
could — rather than bringing on a sudden crisis — result in rising interest 
rates on government debt, as financial investors begin to build the 
possibility of much higher inflation — and even a historically 
unprecedented U.S. default on its obligations
50
 — into the prices (and thus 
the rates of return) of Treasury securities. 
Clearly, the gradual path is preferable to the sudden change. Just as 
clearly, however, no one knows how to predict whether, when, or how a 
fiscal crisis could emerge. One possible response to such uncertainty is to 
call for immediate action to prevent any such future crisis.
51
 It is not, 
 
Budget hosted a chilling conference on ‗What a Fiscal Crisis Would Look Like in the U.S.‘ 
An all-star group discussed: what a tipping point might be; how a crisis might unfold; and 
what policies would be best to avoid a crisis. There was a clear consensus in the room that 
without changes, a crisis [is] inevitable.‖). 
 
47
 The most prominent recent example is Greece. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 4 
(―Much of the new international worry about government spending was prompted by the 
Greek debt crisis this year. It avoided default only with help from other European countries. 
That aid was conditioned on Greece agreeing to a strong austerity program, to be monitored 
by a group including representatives of the International Monetary Fund.‖). 
 
48
 Debt Crisis Looming, supra note 46 (―If investors lose confidence in the U.S., 
interest rates will soar, job creation will slow and the financial health of Americans will 
deteriorate.‖). 
 
49
 Norris, supra note 4 (―[I]n the late 1970s and early 1980s . . . ‗bond vigilantes‘ were 
reluctant to invest in United States Treasury securities because they feared runaway 
inflation. Their refusal drove up the interest rates the government had to pay on its 
borrowings and eventually led the Federal Reserve, under Paul A. Volcker, to wage war 
against inflation even if it meant choking off economic growth.‖). 
 
50
 Although the discussion in Part II.B.1. showed that the United States government 
can always create the money necessary to pay its debts, it is at least possible to imagine that 
a government in the future could choose default over hyper-inflation for strategic reasons. 
 
51
 See, e.g., CRFB Holds Fortuitous Conference on Fiscal Crisis Scenarios, COMM. 
FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET, 2 (May 6, 2010) (―While it is impossible to precisely 
predict the ‗tipping point‘ for a crisis, taking credible steps now is the best way to prevent 
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however, possible to reduce the probability of a market crisis to zero. In the 
face of such uncertainty, one could simply call for action sooner rather than 
later, in the belief that waiting will only make matters worse.
52
 
The risk of a crisis, however, hinges crucially on the psychology of 
markets looking forward for decades. No one doubts that the United States 
government could borrow trillions of dollars in any given year or set of 
years, without setting off a financial crisis, but if there is no long-term plan 
to manage the level of debt, then financial market participants could decide 
at any point that those future risks have become so worrisome that it is 
unwise to own U.S. government debt.
53
 The rush to sell that debt could be 
chaotic, with dire consequences for the U.S. and global economies. 
This aspect of the problem — that it is the expected path of future 
borrowing that determines the likelihood of a financial crisis, rather than the 
size of the deficit this year (or even for the next ten or twenty years) — 
leads some analysts to suggest that the problem for U.S. policymakers is to 
find a way to reassure financial market participants today that the debt 
problem will ultimately be brought under control.
54
 This ―announcement 
effect‖
55
 means that a government with a convincing long-term plan to 
manage deficits and debt can deal with short-term problems by running 
deficits, safe in the knowledge that the financial markets expect deficits to 
return to sustainable levels after the short-term problems are under control. 
While it might seem to be a simple matter of prudent management to 
reduce the risks of a fiscal crisis, it is essential to remember that it is 
anything but costless to reduce fiscal imbalances. These costs include, as 
discussed below, increases in current unemployment, reductions in current 
incomes, and general economic decline.
56
 Calls to reduce deficits as a way 
to avoid fiscal crises, therefore, imply an underlying judgment that the costs 
of deficit reduction will be lower than the probability-adjusted benefits of 
avoiding a financial crisis. 
 
it.‖), available at http://crfb.org/sites/default/files/CRFB_Holds_Fortuitous_Conference_0.   
pdf. 
 
52
 Id. at 1 (―The longer we wait to act, the greater the number of things that could set 
off a crisis.‖). 
 
53
 Debt Crisis Looming, supra note 46 (arguing that ―the financial markets are based 
on faith and that the fiscal standing of the United States will drop when people lose faith that 
policymakers can control fiscal matters‖). 
 
54
 Id. (―The key is to make a commitment to a credible plan now.‖). 
 
55
 Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Announcing the “Announcement 
Effect Club,” COMM. RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010), http://crfb.org/blogs/ 
announcing-announcement-effect-club. 
 
56
 ROBERT EISNER, THE GREAT DEFICIT SCARES: THE FEDERAL BUDGET, TRADE, AND 
SOCIAL SECURITY 3–28, 57–58 (1997). 
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If the justification for enacting restrictive fiscal policy now is to reduce 
the likelihood of a fiscal crisis, however, then we must at least have some 
way of knowing how much we can reduce that likelihood by taking action 
now. Moreover, if participants in the financial markets were really 
convinced that the current fiscal path was (or were on the brink of 
becoming) unsustainable, there should be evidence that things are moving 
in the wrong direction. Yet that is simply not happening. Indeed, despite 
repeated warnings from anti-deficit commentators that a U.S. financial 
crisis is inevitable, interest rates have fallen this year.
57
 ―[F]or now, the 
financial markets seem to fear recession and deflation much more than they 
fear deficit spending.‖
58
 
Even so, what we are currently experiencing might be a brief calm 
before the storm. We might, after all, be only moments away from the onset 
of a crisis. Of course, that is always possible, no matter the situation. False 
Cassandras are not difficult to find, in any situation. Moreover, even if we 
knew when financial traders might decide that the government‘s long-term 
budget situation looks excessively risky, there is no way to know what a 
government must do to convince doubtful financial traders that it will take 
future actions that will solve the problems that have been predicted. 
A government could announce, for example, a budget plan that shows 
long-term sustainability, but financial traders could doubt that various 
elements of that plan will be enacted and sustained. Even a government that 
ran short-term annual surpluses, allowing the government to pay down debt, 
could discover to its surprise that it has not done enough to please financial 
traders, if those traders decide as a group that the government‘s fiscal 
situation might reverse itself at some point. Just as there is no way of 
knowing when a crisis might come, there is no way of knowing how to 
prevent a crisis from occurring or how to satisfy the people who might 
bring the crisis upon us.
59
 There is, in the end, no way to predict what will 
satisfy the psychology of a large group of financial traders. 
 
 
57
 Norris, supra note 4 (―It would be disastrous if either [the United States or the 
United Kingdom] got to the point that investors abandoned it, or even drove up interest rates 
sharply by scaling back their support. But precisely the opposite has happened this year.‖). 
 
58
 Id.; see also Paul Krugman, Appeasing the Bond Gods, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/opinion/20krugman.html?_r=1&ref=paulkrugman 
(―But the argument [that we must appease bond vigilantes] has become even stranger 
recently, as it has become clear that investors aren‘t worried about deficits; they‘re worried 
about stagnation and deflation. And they‘ve been signaling that concern by driving interest 
rates on the debt of major economies lower, not higher. On Thursday, the rate on 10-year 
U.S. bonds was only 2.58 percent.‖). 
 
59
 See Krugman, supra note 58 (ridiculing the idea that ―the bond vigilantes may be 
invisible, but they must be feared all the same‖). 
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As it stands, therefore, no one knows how to assess the likelihood of a 
financial crisis at any particular moment, much less how much that 
likelihood changes in response to specific policy changes. The most that we 
can say is that fiscal cutbacks would probably reduce the likelihood of a 
fiscal crisis by some amount.
60
  That, however, is hardly sufficient to guide 
any responsible policy decisions to reduce budget deficits (through cuts in 
social programs, Medicare, Social Security, or anything else). Even though 
it seems entirely plausible that most of those who somberly call for 
immediate sacrifice in the name of avoiding a fiscal crisis do so in good 
faith, therefore, there is a difference between good intentions and complete 
analysis. 
Consider an analogy: increasing the height of a levee by one foot will 
reduce the likelihood of a flood, but unless we know how to measure the 
reduction in that likelihood, then we are not in a position to decide whether 
to undertake the necessary costs of building up the flood wall. Arguing that 
another foot will reduce the odds of catastrophe simply misses the larger 
point, because the same logic would lead to calls to add three feet, six feet, 
or fifty feet. Counseling ―prudence‖ can sound very good when discussed 
out of context, but that is no guide for policy. 
Policy makers should, of course, constantly monitor the situation for 
signs of a possible crisis, and they should support efforts to expand our 
knowledge of how fiscal crises come about. As it stands, however, the 
argument that we should make immediate or long-term spending cuts (or 
tax increases) in order to prevent a possible fiscal crisis cannot be a 
meaningful guide to calibrating actual changes in policy. 
These shortcomings do not mean that the government can simply 
ignore long-term concerns, of course, but it is important to bear in mind that 
the threat of a financial crisis can be constantly invoked by those who wish, 
as an a priori matter, to force the government to adopt more restrictive 
fiscal policies. 
Budget deficits, therefore, have the potential to cause both short-term 
and long-term damage to an economy. Any government would want to 
manage those risks prudently. Doing so, however, requires that it take into 
account the costs of adopting more restrictive fiscal policies. Those costs 
are discussed below, after a brief discussion of how the government might 
set targets for its annual borrowing. 
 
 
60
 Id. 
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C.  Deficit Targets 
The key question facing any government budgeter is how to determine 
what the appropriate relationship should be, if any, between revenues and 
expenditures. If there were no reason to think about them together, then it 
would be possible simply to determine how much money to spend on roads, 
armies, pollution control, unemployment benefits, cancer research, copier 
paper, and so on — and separately to determine how much money to raise 
from taxes on estates, cigarettes, income, real property, sugary drinks, 
gambling, consumption, pollution, and any other possible targets of 
taxation. Even if there were no reason to worry about the balance or 
imbalance between spending and revenues, there would still be reasons not 
to spend money on wasteful or foolish projects, just as there would still be 
reasons to impose taxes (such as a desire to discourage smoking), even if 
revenues were not needed to fund the government. In such a world, 
however, the difference between expenditures and revenues would be a 
mere residual, not interesting as a matter of policy. 
In the world in which we live, of course, there are limits on how far out 
of balance a government‘s expenditures and revenues can be. In the 
extreme, if the government were to choose never to raise money through 
any means other than borrowing, its revenues would equal zero, and there 
would never be any money available to pay back lenders except by 
borrowing from other lenders. This is unsustainable, which means that there 
must be some limit to how much the government can borrow in the 
aggregate. 
In addition to technical limits on the ability of a national government to 
borrow money, there are also prudential limits. Even though, as explained 
below, it is possible to borrow large amounts of money in a sustainable 
way, there might be undesirable consequences from doing so that could 
overwhelm any positive effects of taxing less than one spends. 
Therefore, the central issue of public finance is to determine the best 
combination of revenues and expenditures, taking into account the effects 
of deficits and surpluses on the economy‘s current and longer-range 
performance.
61
 While intuition and conventional wisdom often suggest that 
the government cannot and should not borrow money, at least not for long, 
that is definitively not what economic theory teaches us. In fact, there are 
several ways to define ―balance‖ in the government‘s finances, each of 
which carries a different technical meaning, as well as a different 
implication for taxing and spending policy. 
 
 
61
 See generally JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE & PUBLIC POLICY (3rd ed. 2010). 
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1. Balanced Budgets 
The term ―balanced budget‖ is bandied about quite loosely in political 
discussion, usually invoked as the only truly responsible target for federal 
budgetary policy. Taken seriously, this would mean that the federal 
government would be required to raise exactly as much money in taxes each 
year as it spends, at least within a (presumably very small) margin for error. 
The case for balanced annual budgets is frequently based on analogies to a 
family‘s finances, with the notion being that a responsible family must pay 
its bills, and so must a responsible government.
62
 
There are, however, several serious issues that would flow from 
adopting a balanced budget target, beginning with the question of the 
proper time period over which balance must occur. As discussed above, the 
U.S. federal deficit is usually expressed as an annual measure, but it can be 
measured over any period of time, from as little as one day up to any length 
of time that one likes (including an infinite time horizon).
63
 Even if one 
believes that the budget should be balanced in the sense that revenues must 
equal expenditures, therefore, there is no reason why that balance must be 
achieved each year, as opposed to each month, decade, or century. 
More fundamentally, the problem with balanced budgets as a target for 
policy is that they do not address the problem that is most often attributed to 
government deficits. That is, if a government should not owe money to 
anyone, then an annually balanced budget will only achieve that goal if the 
government began with no debt. With U.S. debt held by the public set to 
exceed ten trillion dollars by the time this article has been published, 
however, an annually balanced budget would merely lock in place the 
aggregate amount of federal debt that exists at the beginning of the new 
budget balancing regime. Even though such a policy might please its 
adherents by at least not adding to the debt, the existing debt would remain 
unpaid. Therefore, if it is overall debt that is bad, and not merely annual 
deficits, then a government that currently owes money to anyone must not 
only raise enough money to pay for its current expenditures, but it must also 
collect enough money to pay down the existing debt. 
Even that strategy, however, leaves open the enormous question of how 
quickly to reduce overall indebtedness. Given that tax increases and 
 
 
62
 See, e.g., Robert Hurt Wins Endorsements from the Register and Bee, News and 
Advance, and Richmond Times-Dispatch, ROBERTHURTFORCONGRESS.COM, Oct. 24, 2010, 
http://www.roberthurtforcongress.com/2010/10/robert-hurt-wins-endorsements-from-the- 
register-and-bee-news-and-advance-and-richmond-times-dispatch/. 
 
63
 See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 27 (critiquing a proposal to measure 
the net present value of all future spending and revenues into the infinite future). 
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reductions in spending tend to shrink the economy (at least in the short 
run),
64
 a government that wishes to reduce its overall debt must balance that 
desire against the danger of creating (or worsening) a recession or 
depression. Given current debt levels, efforts to pay down the entire debt in 
large chunks would be economically disastrous. Even if the economy were 
not already facing high unemployment and the possibility of a second round 
of economic decline, and even if the annual deficit were already at zero, the 
prospect of finding even a relatively modest sum like $300 billion each year 
— which would allow the federal government to pay down the total federal 
debt over several decades — would be quite difficult politically. And as 
discussed later, this fiscal contraction would put downward pressure on the 
economy and upward pressure on unemployment, not just in the first year 
but in every year of the government‘s efforts to wring an extra $300 billion 
out of the economy to pay down federal debt. 
In short, proposals to reduce deficits — much less to reduce or erase all 
outstanding government debt — must be evaluated in terms of their 
tradeoffs. As we reduce deficits and debt, we need to understand why we 
are doing so, in order to know whether the benefits justify the costs of fiscal 
contraction. While the discussion to this point has simply taken the desire to 
reduce deficits and/or debt as a given, it is important to examine arguments 
in favor of deficit reduction that go beyond simple-minded beliefs that 
deficits and debt are per se bad. As the discussion below will demonstrate, 
all such arguments result not in policies to eliminate government deficits 
and debt but in policies for limiting deficits and debt. That is, even the 
strongest arguments against deficit spending will, if taken seriously, result 
in deficits and debt continuing into the indefinite future. 
2. Percentage Targets and the Debt-to-Income Ratio 
Beyond simple-minded attempts to set the annual deficit to zero, there 
are several more sophisticated ways to determine a deficit target. Many 
economists refer to an annual limit on the deficit of 3% of GDP; for 
example, President Obama‘s outgoing budget advisor argued late last year 
that ―in 2015, 2016, 2017, we need to get to something around 3 percent of 
the economy so that debt is no longer rising as a share of the economy.‖
65
 
The idea, therefore, is to run an annual deficit that will add to the debt, 
but not to do so in a way that increases the ratio of overall national debt to 
GDP. One of President George W. Bush‘s chief economic advisors, N. 
 
 
64
 See supra Part III.B. 
 
65
 Mike Dorning, Orszag Seeks Budget Deficit of 3 Percent of GDP in Six Years, 
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 17, 2009. 
BUCHANAN.FORMATTED.8 (FOR ONLINE EDITION ONLY) 8/31/2011  10:42 AM 
2011] Good Deficits 97 
 
Gregory Mankiw, a conservative economist who has returned to the 
Economics Department at Harvard University, also endorses the constant 
debt-to-GDP ratio as a target: ―[E]ven in the long run, a balanced budget is 
too strict a standard. Because of technological progress, population growth 
and inflation, the nation‘s income and tax base grows over time. If the 
government‘s debts grow at or below that pace, servicing the debt will not 
become a major problem.‖
66
 The government can, therefore, ―run budget 
deficits in perpetuity, as long as they are not too large.‖
67
 
There are two difficulties even with this much more reasonable 
standard, however. First, the 3% target is entirely arbitrary and is not a good 
guide for long-term deficits.
68
 Even though that specific target is officially 
the limit for all members of the European Union,
69
 there is no reason to 
believe that that number will keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant.
70
 Indeed, 
if GDP were to rise by 5% annually (which would be the result of targeted 
real growth of 3% and an inflation target of 2%), then the debt could also 
grow by 5% without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio. Attempts to meet an 
annual 3% target, therefore, would only coincidentally succeed in keeping 
the debt-to-GDP ratio constant. 
More fundamentally, there is no reason to believe that the current ratio 
of national debt to GDP is the ―right‖ percentage. Yet an effort to keep the 
debt-to-GDP ratio constant would, if successful, enshrine the current 
arbitrary level as a policy ideal. If the recent increase in deficits was really 
harmful, then should we not try to return to the level of debt-to-GDP that 
existed before the recession began? Or, as discussed above, why not go to 
zero? If an annual balanced budget is ―too strict,‖
71
 however, then we 
certainly could not run the annual surpluses necessary to pay down the 
national debt. 
This would suggest that we might be able to find a level of the debt-to-
GDP ratio that is too high, to set an upper limit on federal borrowing. Some 
recent work comparing debt levels and economic experiences cross-
nationally suggests that a debt-to-GDP ratio of 90% is the point at which 
the average country grows more slowly.
72
 Some analysts have seized upon 
 
 
66
 N. Gregory Mankiw, What‟s Sustainable About This Budget?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
2010. 
 
67
 Id. 
 
68
 Luigi L. Pasinetti, The Myth (or Folly) of the 3% Deficit/GDP Maastricht 
„Parameter‟, 22 CAMB. J. ECON. 103, 103 (1998). 
 
69
 Id. 
 
70
 Id. 
 
71
 Mankiw, supra note 66. 
 
72
 Carmen Reinhart & Ken Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt 22 (Nat‘l Bureau of 
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this as yet another reason to be scared about the U.S. fiscal situation, 
because (by some measures) the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio could pass 90% 
next year.
73
 
This is, at least, a start in trying to understand the appropriate debt-to-
GDP ratio. Even so, it is the only study of its kind, comparing countries 
around the world. One economist, for example, noted ―the ability . . . of 
some advanced countries to manage debt burdens as high as 250 percent of 
GDP.‖
74
 Moreover, there is no way to know whether the causality runs 
from high debt to low growth, or low growth to high debt.
75
 
In short, there is no good answer to the question of how high the deficit 
can be, either in a given year or over the long term. Rather than fighting 
over whether the deficit is at the ―right‖ level, therefore, the more sensible 
approach is to ask on an ongoing basis whether any particular change in the 
deficit — through either changes in taxes or spending — is justified on the 
basis of its contribution to the economy‘s health and to people‘s well-being. 
As discussed below, there are both short-run and long-run policies that will 
meet that criterion. We need to put in place a system of governance that 
does not forsake those policies in the mistaken belief that the deficit simply 
must be reduced. 
III.  GOOD DEFICITS IN THE SHORT RUN: FIGHTING RECESSIONS 
Even some of the most adamant opponents of deficits concede that 
there is such a thing as a ―good deficit.‖
76
 The standard theory is that 
deficits are acceptable in the short run, if the economy is weak. Although 
even this basic wisdom has been drowned out in the current political 
atmosphere, it must be remembered that this point of view is absolutely the 
standard position among macroeconomists.
77
 While one can argue about 
 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,639, 2010). 
 
73
 Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, The 90 Percent Debt-to-GDP 
Threshold and CBO‟s New Debt Estimates, COMM. RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET BLOG (Mar. 
9, 2010) (―[S]ometime this decade we will reach a point where our debt is sufficiently high 
to slow growth in a significant way.‖). 
 
74
 Paul Krugman, Debt and Transfiguration, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Mar. 12, 
2010), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/debt-and-transfiguration/. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 GOOD DEFICIT/BAD DEFICIT, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Apr. 2009). 
 
77
 This is not to say that there are no voices raised in dissent against that standard 
position. Some economists who generally oppose active government involvement in 
economic stabilization continue to argue against the efficacy and wisdom of deficit 
spending, even in the face of the worst ongoing unemployment crisis since the Great 
Depression. See, e.g., Robert Barro, The Folly of Subsidizing Unemployment, WALL ST. J., 
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political aspects of deficit spending, such as whether delays of the 
legislative process will cause the deficit spending to be mistimed, there is 
very broad agreement that it is not only acceptable but wise to fight 
economic downturns with fiscal policy — especially if monetary policy 
cannot be counted on to push the economy back in the right direction.
78
 
Because of that broad agreement, there is little need to go into 
excessive detail about the mechanisms by which short-run deficits work to 
improve a weak economy. This section, therefore, simply offers a brief 
summary of how budget deficits work during a recession. Because the case 
for long-run deficits is somewhat less well-known (though not, ultimately, 
more economically controversial) the next section will discuss the case for 
long-run deficits in a somewhat more painstaking fashion. 
A.  Weak Economies Need Help to Be Brought Back to Life 
When an economy is in a recession, which has been the situation in the 
United States (and most other countries) from 2008 through the date of this 
 
Aug. 30, 2010 (professor in Harvard‘s Economics Department arguing that, ―[i]n general, the 
[Obama] administration has been too focused on expanding government, redistributing more 
from rich to poor, and stimulating aggregate demand‖); Michael J. Boskin, Why the 
Spending Stimulus Failed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010 (former chief economist to the first 
President Bush, now professor in Stanford‘s Economics Department summarizing some 
studies challenging the standard view of deficit spending during recessions — but favoring 
tax cuts, which can also increase aggregate demand — and concluding that ―[t]hese 
empirical studies leave many leading economists dubious about the ability of government 
spending to boost the economy in the short run‖); Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna, Large 
Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus Spending (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 15438, 2009) (describing cross-national study of economically advanced 
countries‘ uses of fiscal stimulus, claiming to find evidence that ―spending cuts adopted to 
reduce deficits have been associated with economic expansions rather than recessions‖); 
Alberto Alesina, Tax Cuts vs. Deficits: The Evidence Is In, WALL ST. J., Sep. 15, 2010 
(―How can spending cuts be expansionary? First, they signal that tax increases will not occur 
in the future, or that if they do they will be smaller.‖). But see Paul Krugman, Expansionary 
Austerity?, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Aug. 20, 2010), http://krugman.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2010/08/20/expansionary-austerity/ (critiquing the arguments in Alesina and 
Ardagna, and Alesina, and concluding: ―Here‘s a comprehensive list of [cases where 
austerity led to growth]: Ireland 1987‖). See also Arjun Jayadev & Mike Konczal, THE 
ROOSEVELT INST., THE BOOM NOT THE SLUMP: THE RIGHT TIME FOR AUSTERITY (Aug. 23, 
2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/not_the_time_for_austerity.pdf     
(criticizing the claims in Alesina and Ardagna, concluding ―that there is little evidence 
provided by [Alesina and Ardagna] that cutting the federal deficit in the short-term, under 
the conditions the United States currently faces, would improve the country‘s prospects. It 
may even make the United States‘ situation far worse‖). 
 
78
 See infra Part III.B. 
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writing, the elements that might provide strength to an economy all begin to 
move in the wrong direction, enhancing the negative effects of the recession 
in a vicious cycle of decline. There is not, in other words, a reliable method 
by which one can expect the economy to turn around, other than simply 
waiting and hoping that the economy will hit bottom and turn around on its 
own. 
The four major sectors of the economy — the sources of spending that 
provide businesses with their reason for being, allowing them to hire 
workers — are: consumers who buy goods and services, businesses that buy 
capital equipment from other businesses, governments that both consume 
and invest, and foreign buyers of the nation‘s exports. The three 
nongovernmental sectors, however, all have completely rational reasons 
during a recession to make decisions that will make the economy as a whole 
worse off. 
When consumers see that the economy is weakening, they worry that 
they might lose their jobs, so even the people whose consumption is not 
directly reduced by having been laid off are nonetheless wise to cut back 
their consumption spending. This, in turn, gives businesses reason to lay off 
still more workers, since the goods or services that companies currently 
offer for sale are no longer being sold. The newly laid-off workers are thus 
forced to retrench, and the news that there have been yet more layoffs 
makes the remaining workers even more reluctant to spend. 
Because businesses see the economy weakening, furthermore, they 
have no reason to invest in capital equipment, new technology, or anything 
else that would allow a business to expand. There is no need for new 
investment, because the existing capital stock is more than sufficient to 
produce the smaller amount of output that can be sold under depressed 
economic conditions. 
Exports could be a lifeline for an economy, allowing a country to sell 
its goods to foreigners who might still be spending.
79
 If a recession affects a 
large number of countries, however, there are fewer and fewer places to 
find people who can buy one‘s goods. Each country that is in recession, 
moreover, is motivated to try to export its way back to prosperity. Since it is 
literally impossible for every country to import less and export more at the 
same time, the use of the export sector to save the economy is only possible 
for a few lucky countries. 
Only government spending remains. If the government refuses to spend 
to fight the recession, the recession will continue, and perhaps worsen. 
 
 
79
 See, e.g., John Murphy, Dear 44: Economic Lifeline, POLITICO, Oct. 13, 2008, http:// 
www.politico.com/news/stories/1008/14469.html. 
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Moreover, if the government insists on increasing taxes whenever it 
increases spending, any positive impact of the spending is all but 
eliminated.
80
 Only a direct increase in the deficit has a hope of turning the 
economy around, and only then if the change in the deficit puts money into 
the hands of people who are likely to spend it.
81
 
B.  Possible Economic Damage from Reducing Deficits 
In short, only government policy can swim against the tides of a weak 
economy. When the government perversely cuts back spending during a 
recession, of course, that only makes matters worse. Moreover, even when 
the economy is not in a recession, cutting government spending can turn 
things in the wrong direction. 
Imagine, for example, that the U.S. government reduced its spending in 
a year by $300 billion, or about 2% of GDP.
82
 This would reduce the size of 
the economy, at least in the immediate term, because (as described above) 
government spending is one of the four major categories that make up GDP. 
Reductions in the government‘s spending reduce the incomes of the people 
and businesses who would have received that spending in exchange for 
work performed, goods delivered, and so on. 
Moreover, everything now works in the opposite direction from that 
described above, when the government increases spending during a 
recession.
83
 When people and companies lose income, they in turn reduce 
their spending (and, in the case of businesses, hiring), which is the classic 
―multiplier effect‖ of fiscal policy — so called because a one dollar 
reduction in spending by the federal government sets in a motion a chain of 
 
 
80
 As a technical matter, the ―balanced-budget multiplier‖ — the multiple by which 
GDP increases when both spending and taxes go up by the same amount — is generally a 
positive number. This means that ―pay as you go‖ rules do not entirely neuter expansionary 
fiscal policies, but they drastically reduce their effectiveness. 
 
81
 Tax cuts for people whose basic needs are already being met — people, in other 
words, who have relatively high incomes — are thus not particularly stimulative to the 
economy. Having the government itself do the spending most directly puts money into the 
economy, because doing so does not rely upon an individual‘s decision about whether to 
spend the money. Businesses that sell their wares to the government, in turn, then have an 
incentive to begin to hire more workers. See the discussion on the estimates of the impact of 
various types of spending and tax cuts, infra note 85. 
 
82
 Three hundred billion dollars is equal to 2% of 2010‘s nearly $15 trillion GDP. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE, (Aug. 2010),  
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11705/08-18-Update.pdf, at xiv Summ. Tbl. 2 (showing 
forecast for GDP in 2010 of $14,804 billion). 
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 See supra Part III.A. 
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events that results in more than one dollar of GDP being lost to the 
economy.
84
 The size of the government spending multiplier continues to be 
the subject of extensive empirical investigation, with one recent estimate 
suggesting that a one percent increase in government spending leads to 
more than a 1.5% increase in GDP about a year later,
85
 and a more recent 
estimate of various types of government spending showing that the 
multiplier ranges from as low as 1.13 to as high as 1.74.
86
 If the highest 
number is accurate, that would mean that a 2% reduction in government 
spending would lead to a 3.5% decline in GDP.
87
 
To err on the side of caution, however, assume that there is no 
multiplier effect at all, that is, that GDP shrinks by exactly as much as the 
federal government cuts its spending in a given year, assuming (counter-
intuitively and counter-factually) that private actors who lose incomes 
because of reduced federal spending choose not to change their behavior, 
negating any possible ripple effect of cutbacks. The hypothesized 2% cut in 
spending would then shrink GDP by only 2%, rather than 3.5%.
88
 
According to a well-known empirical regularity called ―Okun‘s Law,‖ this 
would lead to an increase in the unemployment rate of roughly 1%.
89
 If the 
economy had started in a period of full-employment and broad prosperity, 
with the unemployment rate at 4%, the spending cut would have put over 
one million people out of work, raising the unemployment rate to 5% or 
 
 
84
 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 262-64 (4th ed. 2000). 
 
85
 See Christina Romer & Jared Bernstein, The Job Impact of the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Plan, app. 1, at 12 (Jan. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/The_Job_Impact_of_the_American_ 
Recovery_and_Reinvestment_Plan.pdf. A tax increase will have a smaller multiplier, 
because taxes do not show up directly in GDP. A tax increase, therefore, will only reduce 
GDP if it causes spending reductions by people or businesses. If it does, those reductions 
will also spill over into further spending cuts, as those who receive lower incomes after their 
employers and customers cut back on spending do likewise. If the tax increase does not 
cause an initial reduction in spending, however, there will be nothing to multiply, and there 
will be no reduction in GDP. See id. (showing that the tax multiplier plateaus just below a 
value of 1, meaning that a 1% of GDP cut in taxes will lead to almost a 1% increase in 
GDP). 
 
86
 Perspectives on the U.S. Economy Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Budget, 111th 
Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist, Moody‘s Analytics) [hereinafter 
Testimony of Mark Zandi]. 
 
87
 See id. 
 
88
 See id. 
 
89
 ―Okun‘s Law‖ holds, as a rough approximation, that a 1% decrease (increase) in 
GDP is associated with a 2–2.5% decrease (increase) in unemployment. See MANKIW, supra 
note 84, at 36. 
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more.
90
 
However, the current economic situation is unique: ―Under Okun‘s 
Law, a formula for the relationship between output and unemployment 
described by the 1960s-era White House economist Arthur Okun, the 
jobless rate at the end of 2009 would have been around 8.3 percent instead 
of 10 percent.‖
91
 If the historical relationship between lost GDP and job 
losses has gotten worse, then attempts to cut the deficit can impose an even 
larger long-term cost on the economy and the nation‘s citizens. 
The short-term costs of deficit reduction can thus be severe, especially 
because they are concentrated on a small group of people rather than spread 
throughout the economy.
92
 The harms imposed on a small, vulnerable 
group can also have long-lasting effects, because the people thus affected 
can suffer losses from extended bouts of unemployment that are difficult to 
reverse, if they can be reversed at all. These consequences of 
unemployment include suicides and other acts of violence;
93
 but they also 
include the loss of skills and health that accompany being laid off from 
one‘s job.
94
 
Of course, it is possible for monetary policy to offset some or all of this 
effect, with decreases in interest rates creating economic stimulus to offset 
the fiscal contraction. The ability of monetary policymakers to deal with 
this problem, however, is significantly less than perfect. The larger the 
fiscal contraction, the larger must be the offsetting monetary stimulus. 
There is a time lag between the onset of the monetary stimulus and its 
impact on the economy, with real harms continuing until the positive 
impact of the decreased interest rates is felt.
95
 Moreover, depending upon 
how low interest rates are at the beginning of the process, monetary 
policymakers might well reach the limit of their ability to offset the fiscal 
decline. During the 2008-2009 period, for example, interest rates were 
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 See Testimony of Mark Zandi, supra note 86, at 7. 
 
91
 John Harwood, Mystery for White House: Where Did the Jobs Go?, THE CAUCUS 
(Jul. 19, 2010), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/mystery-for-white-house- 
where-did-the-jobs-go/?scp=1&sq=%22welcome%20as%20it%20is%22&st=cse. 
 
92
 A 1% across-the-board decline in income would hurt everyone a little bit, whereas a 
100% decline in income for 1% of the work force would hurt over one million people 
severely. 
 
93
 T.A. Blakely, S.C.D. Collings & J. Atkinson, Unemployment and Suicide. Evidence 
for a Causal Association?, 57 J. EPIDEMIOL COMMUNITY HEALTH 594, 594 (2003) (finding 
that ―[b]eing unemployed was associated with a twofold to threefold increased relative risk 
of death by suicide, compared with being employed‖). 
 
94
 See Claudia Rowe, Those Who‟ve Lost Careers Face Deep Psychological Stress, 
THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010. 
 
95
 ANDREW B. ABEL & BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 541-42 (5th ed. 2005). 
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already so low that there was virtually no room to engage in traditional 
interest rate cuts to fight the ever-deepening recession.
96
 
The point here is not to discuss all of the nuances of fiscal and 
monetary policy options — issues well beyond the focus of this paper — 
but to note that there are very serious consequences of fiscal cutbacks. In 
addition to the indirect effects discussed above, it must also be remembered 
that cuts in government spending result in people losing the benefit of 
whatever spending has been cut.
97
 If a person was receiving government-
provided job training, for example, then a budget cut to eliminate spending 
on that program will not only harm the economy by putting the job 
counselors into the ranks of the unemployed, but the beneficiary of that 
training will also be worse off.
98
 When a state government loses a federal 
grant to cover school costs, teachers are laid off, and children are forced 
into larger classes with less contact with the teachers who remain.
99
 
Moreover, if the cutback takes the form of reducing federal spending on 
long-term investments (such as education), the consequences will be much 
more long-lasting.
100
 
In short, discussions of ―fiscal responsibility‖ are incomplete if they 
focus only on the reductions in the deficit that accompany spending cuts. 
Cutting spending also means reducing someone‘s income, and while some 
cuts can be ―no-brainers‖ because they eliminate pure waste,
101
 the 
persistence of many spending programs is at least partly explained by the 
fact that such programs provide value to someone. Even when a program 
 
 
96
 It is true that the Fed has engaged in some nontraditional methods to stimulate the 
economy even when its target interest rate had been reduced to near zero, but those creative 
methods were also quite controversial. 
 
97
 See, e.g., Cuts Hurt NY Environment Department, Officials Say, CBS N.Y., Nov. 18, 
2010, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/11/18/cuts-hurt-ny-environment-department       - 
officials-say/ (explaining how budget and staffing cuts keep the New York Department of 
Environmental Conservation from performing its job); see also Lisa Singleton-Rickman, 
School Funding: What‟s Next?, TIMES DAILY, Nov. 25, 2010, http://www.timesdaily.com/ 
article/20101125/news/101129871?Title=School-funding-What-s-next. 
 
98
 See Singleton-Rickman, supra note 97 (discussing the effects of cutting government 
spending on education, ―I‘m afraid it will be larger classes and teachers losing out on 
professional development — the kind of things that have helped make our system strong‖). 
 
99
 See id. 
 
100
 See infra Part IV (regarding the difference between government consumption and 
government investment). 
 
101
 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Lobbying Imperils Overhaul of Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 4, 2010 (discussing the 2010 change in the federal student loan program, which ended 
the subsidy program that gave money to lenders to make loans that were risk-free, because 
they were guaranteed by the federal government). 
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does not do so, however, there is at least a short-term loss to the economy 
for virtually every cut in spending, because the spending cuts result in 
people losing their jobs. That affects not just the laid off workers, but their 
families and communities, and the broader economy as well. 
C.  Deficits Use Resources That Would Otherwise Lie Idle 
As described earlier in this article, the most important and plausible 
harm from running deficits is ―crowding out,‖ which is the process by 
which the government‘s deficit claims resources that might have been used 
by private businesses to expand their productive capacity.
102
 If the economy 
is operating below capacity, however, there is a temporary free lunch, in 
that the government can hire workers and machines that would otherwise 
remain idle.
103
 
Because of this, the private sector is not disadvantaged by the 
government‘s additional involvement in the economy, and indeed the new 
government workers are enabled to buy items from private companies that 
they otherwise would not have been able to afford. This can encourage 
private firms to increase spending on productive plant and equipment, 
creating a virtuous cycle that can help to end the downturn. The process by 
which government spending can increase private investment is known as 
―Crowding In.‖
104
 
Since there is no tradeoff between government and private spending 
during a downturn, therefore, crowding out is only a relevant concern 
during periods of prosperity.
105
 
D.  The Increase in Overall Debt During Recessions is Sustainable 
The final aspect of running deficits in the short run is whether — 
notwithstanding all of the other benefits that deficits have in mitigating 
recessions — the resulting increases in the national debt are a matter of 
concern. The short answer is that they are not. As noted above, there is wide 
agreement that a constant ratio of national debt to GDP represents a 
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 See supra Part II. 
 
103
 See Benjamin M. Friedman, Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic 
Consequences of Financing Government Deficits, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 
593, 596–97 (1978). 
 
104
 See id.; Neil H. Buchanan, The Effects of the Fiscal Deficit on the Composition of 
U.S. GDP: An Analysis of Disaggregated Data, in IMPROVING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 133 
(Paul Davidson & Jan A. Kregel eds., 1997). 
 
105
 See Friedman, supra note 103. 
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sustainable and fiscally responsible situation.
106
 Short-run deficits, by 
definition, increase national debt by a finite amount. If it takes, say, an 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 10% to end a recession, the debt after 
the recession is over will not continue to rise (at least, not because of anti-
recessionary spending). 
Moreover, a healthy economy will return to a higher level of GDP, thus 
lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio below where it would have been had the 
economy continued to languish. In addition, because GDP grows annually 
in a healthy economy, any increase in the overall debt due to anti-
recessionary spending will shrink as a percentage of GDP, as the economy 
grows in the future.
107
 
In sum, an ailing economy needs ―good deficits‖ in the form of higher 
government spending. Failing to provide such stimulus needlessly extends 
the misery of a recession, and it does nothing to improve the long-term 
health of the economy. 
IV.  GOOD DEFICITS IN THE LONG RUN: ENHANCING GROWTH 
An essential responsibility of conscientious governance is to determine 
the likely effects of our current spending decisions on future well-being. 
The most important of these long-term effects, however, are not to be found 
in measurements of budget deficits but rather in the nature of the spending 
projects that we undertake. Some government projects help only people 
living today, others will provide benefits only to people in the future, and 
still others will be a boon to the present and the future alike. For legal and 
policy analysts, therefore, the most important issue in assessing any 
government policy is not whether it increases the deficit, but whether the 
policy is in a meaningful sense ―worth it.‖
108
 
The concept of public investment is not difficult to understand. The 
wisest way to spend money is not necessarily to spend as little as possible. 
The question of what the government buys is just as important as how much 
 
 
106
 See supra Part II. 
 
107
 MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF 
MOVEMENTS FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT, 13 n.36 (Sept. 17, 2010) (―In the 1990s, 
debt held by the public as a percentage of GDP declined during deficit years because GDP 
grew faster than the debt itself thereby decreasing the ratio. Because of this, declines in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio are more common historically than budget surpluses.‖). 
 
108
 Joe Minarik, Good Debt, Bad Debt, HUFFINGTON POST, July 29, 2010, http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-minarik/good-debt-and-bad-debt_b_664046.html (concluding 
that public investment should be paid for up-front, but noting that certain types of 
investments are more productive than others, ―Public investment is essential. . . . Public debt 
can be a necessary evil.‖). 
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it buys, or whether to run a deficit. Cutting spending on productive 
investments in the name of fiscal responsibility is simply unwise. As one 
analyst argued early in the 2008 presidential election season: ―For all their 
recent talk about wasteful spending, none of the Republican [presidential] 
hopefuls have offered specifics about what they would ax. But in the past, 
their targets have been programs that foster better health, education and 
infrastructure. Those are precisely the investments we need for economic 
vitality.‖
109
 Indeed, the Bush administration — which at least claimed to 
disapprove of government spending programs — was willing to spend 
money on projects that would enhance future prosperity.
110
 
Moreover, the government‘s budget itself — not just general economic 
prosperity — is often harmed by short-term thinking that treats budget cuts 
as inherently good, even when such cuts are especially foolish: 
Preventing cancer, or treating it early, is a lot less expensive than 
treating advanced cancer. So what did this president do? He 
proposed a cut in the program of $1.4 million . . ., which would 
mean that 4,000 fewer women would have access to early 
detection. This makes no sense. In human terms, it is cruel. From a 
budget standpoint, it‘s self-defeating . . . ―It won‘t save money. . . . 
You don‘t save money by not diagnosing cancer early. You end up 
spending more money because anyone who develops cancer will 
get into the health care system and they will be treated. And the 
cost at that point will be a lot more. The logic here is very simple: 
the later you diagnose cancer of the breast or cervix, the more 
expensive it is to the country.‖
111
 
The case for running deficits in the long run, or when the economy is 
not in a recession, is not as simple as the case for stimulus spending. Even 
so, there is ultimately very little disagreement among economists that it is 
possible to have the government improve the economy by investing in 
capital that will improve living standards in the long run.
112
 The concept 
 
 
109
 Editorial, Deficit Demagogues, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at A16. 
 
110
 Elisabeth Bumiller & Adam Nagourney, Bush, Resetting Agenda, Says U.S. Must 
Cut Reliance on Oil; Funds for Science, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1 (―[In his 2006 State 
of the Union address, President Bush] proposed a substantial increase in financing for basic 
science research, called for training 70,000 new high school Advanced Placement teachers 
and recruiting 30,000 math and science professionals into the nation‘s classrooms.‖). 
 
111
 Bob Herbert, Illogical Cutbacks on Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at A23 
(quoting Dr. Harold Freeman, a physician specializing in the prevention and treatment of 
cancer). 
 
112
 Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent, Politics and Efficiency of Separating 
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has been well known to economists for decades,
113
 and it has been 
implemented in other countries at various times, as well as by many U.S. 
state governments.
114
 The problem, as discussed below, is not with the 
concept but with the politics. First, however, it is useful to describe how a 
government can run deficits into the indefinite future in a way that enhances 
the well-being of its current and future citizens. 
A.  The Tradeoff Between Government and Business Spending: Theory 
If the government buys or produces goods and services (when the 
economy is not in a recession), it will displace some kinds of private 
activity.
115
 An essential question for policy makers (though hardly the only 
question) is whether swapping private spending for public spending will 
increase or decrease living standards in the future. 
Answering that question requires two steps. First, we need to know 
whether the government spending and the private spending that are being 
traded off would be used to purchase investment goods, like factories and 
machinery that will last a long time and can be used to increase future 
productivity, or consumption goods, which have no long-term benefit. 
Second, if both entities would invest rather than consume, we must compare 
the payoffs of the respective investments. 
Consider the first part of that analysis. If the government would spend 
its money on investment goods, while the private spending would have 
been used to purchase consumption goods, the situation is simple: the 
government‘s spending will surely increase future living standards, relative 
to what they would have been if the money had been spent on private 
consumption. Similarly, if the choice is between private investment and 
public consumption, future growth obviously will be higher if the spending 
is done by private entities. Imagine, for example, that the government were 
to throw a large party by hiring people who would otherwise be working as 
computer programmers and construction workers. In that case, the future 
productive capacity of the economy would be reduced.
116
 
 
Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets, 121 Q. J. OF ECON. 1167 (Nov. 2006) (showing 
an increase in economic efficiency when the government finances investments with 
increases in public debt). 
 
113
 Id. at 1169 (―John Maynard Keynes long . . . advocated the rule.‖). 
 
114
 Id. at 1167. 
 
115
 See Friedman, supra note 103, at 635 (―Under either transactions crowding out or 
portfolio crowding out, income increases because each dollar of government spending 
replaces a smaller, though still strictly positive, amount of private investment.‖). 
 
116
 If the government throws its party by hiring the people who would have worked at a 
privately-funded party, then future production is unaffected. 
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The interesting situation is the second part of the analysis, where both 
the government and the private sector would spend money on productive 
investments. In that situation, long-term growth is maximized when the 
money is spent on the investment project that has a higher payoff, i.e. a 
higher rate of return. If the government has on tap a project that could 
return 10% annually on investment, while a private firm wishes to finance a 
project that could pay 5%, then the government‘s spending is a better way 
to raise the living standards of future generations. 
Determining the expected rate of return on investment projects is, of 
course, anything but an exact science, as discussed at some length in the 
next section. As a very rough proxy, however, we can assume that private 
firms have conducted their own financial analyses and will engage in 
investment projects that pay a higher rate of return than the cost of 
borrowing for the firm. If a firm can borrow at 3% and invest at 5%, that is 
a profitable proposition. Firms are thus believed to forgo those projects with 
low rates of return, relative to the interest rates at which they borrow. 
The returns on potential government investments are not as easy to 
determine.
117
 If we had perfect information, we could simply maximize the 
output available to future generations by allowing the government to 
engage in investment projects with rates of return that exceed market 
interest rates. If our goal is to maximize future growth, the ideal stance for 
the government is thus not to reduce spending to the lowest possible level 
but to spend only on projects that have rates of return that exceed the 
interest rate for private borrowing.
118
 
 
 
117
 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation 
of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 364–78 (1970) (discussing options 
for determining which public investments to undertake given the uncertainty of returns on 
investment). 
 
118
 This, however, still leaves open the question of why we must maximize the capital 
stock that we pass on to our heirs. Given that economic growth is generally on an upward 
trend, why is it necessary to give our wealthy grandchildren even greater wealth? The broad 
(within the economics profession as well as among politicians) silence on this question is 
notable, to say the least. The unspoken assumption is quite blunt: we must not do anything to 
reduce the capital stock that we bequeath to our children and grandchildren. Perhaps it is 
time to question that assumption more aggressively. See Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We 
Owe Future Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1250-57 (2009). (Moreover, 
although the subject for a different article, it is equally important to account for the 
―intergenerational unfairness‖ created by problems such as environmental damage.) 
Notwithstanding that concern, the present analysis adopts the conventional approach in 
attempting to maximize future growth for the benefit of future people. 
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B.  Capital Budgeting, Growth Budgeting, and Future Well-Being 
The fundamental accounting concept of ―capital budgeting‖ separates 
government expenditures into two categories: purchases of goods and 
services for current consumption that provide no long-term payoff 
(―operating expenditures‖), and purchases of productive capital goods that 
do generate long-term payoffs (―capital expenditures‖).
119
 The capital 
budget thus accounts for items whose benefits are longer-lasting and can be 
expected to produce economic activity and growth in the future that is 
greater than would otherwise happen.
120
 One rough estimate of the fraction 
of federal spending that can be categorized as capital expenditures is 
25%.
121
 With federal spending at $3 trillion in fiscal 2009,
122
 that rough 
guide would mean that $750 billion of that year‘s spending by the federal 
government went toward items that are likely to pay for themselves over the 
long run.
123
 
It is also possible, as discussed below, to expand the range of possible 
public investments that would count as capital expenditures to include those 
that do not produce physical infrastructure but that nevertheless provide 
long-term economic benefits. Adding these items — such as spending on 
basic research, health care, nutrition, etc. — to the more narrowly defined 
capital budget, I use the term ―growth budgeting‖ to describe a modified 
capital budgeting system through which the government can identify 
available long-term investments that could benefit posterity. 
Capital budgeting as an accounting concept is so fundamental that it 
must be as old as accounting itself. Any sensible decision maker would 
want to know whether spending is being undertaken for immediate 
gratification or for long-term benefit. By accounting convention, publicly 
held corporations must separate operating and capital expenditures. Indeed, 
most ―profitable‖ corporations would not be viewed as such if they were 
prevented from segregating their capital expenditures from their operating 
expenditures, since even the most profitable corporations borrow money 
 
 
119
 JACK RABIN, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, 155 
(Merker Dekker, Inc. 2003). 
 
120
 Many capital projects are likely to bring with them the requirement of at least a 
minimal level of maintenance expenditures. Depreciation of the existing capital stock and 
maintenance expenditures are thus netted out of the capital account. 
 
121
 See Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal, supra note 23. 
 
122
 Congressional Budget Office, CBO‟s Baseline Budget Projections (Apr. 4, 2008),  
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/90xx/doc9015/Selected_Tables.pdf. 
 
123
 See id. 
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every year (that is, they run ―deficits‖).
124
 Similarly, the vast majority of 
state and local governments use capital budgeting.
125
 The requirement that 
most U.S. state governments balance their budgets is, indeed, not what it 
might seem, because a state can still borrow money for capital spending 
even if it does not have the tax revenue to pay for the capital items in the 
year in which they are purchased.
126
 
Almost all large organizations in the world, including governments, 
have adopted some form of a capital budget, with the U.S. federal 
government standing out for its failure to adopt (and to be disciplined by) a 
capital accounting system.
127
 It is odd, therefore, that the federal 
government would not use capital budgeting. This failure has led to a great 
deal of consternation among budget analysts, concern that becomes 
especially pronounced when assessing the federal government‘s options in 
the face of large-scale crises such as the damage due to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita on the Gulf Coast in 2005, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010, and more generally the government‘s failure to invest systematically 
in future productivity.
128
 
 
 
124
 Mark Mizruchi & Linda Stearns, A Longitudinal Study of Borrowing By Large 
American Corporations, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 118, 138 (1994) (―Many of a firm‘s most critical 
decisions, including plant expansion, development of new technologies, entering new 
product lines, and acquisitions of other firms, require the use of external financing. . . . All 
corporations borrow money.‖). 
 
125
 RABIN, supra note 119, at 155 (―Eighty-four percent of state governments separate 
capital expenditures from operating expenditures, 40% of counties separate capital 
expenditures from operating expenditures, and 71% of cities separate capital expenditures 
from operating expenditures.‖). 
 
126
 See id. (―State and local governments use capital budgets because it improves 
decision efficiency since capital assets can be financed either by revenue raised currently 
(taxes, charges, grants, etc.) or by borrowing on the promise to repay from future revenues. 
If operating and capital expenditures are combined, capital assets appear more expensive 
relative to operating expenditures, even though they will be used over a number of years. 
Capital budgets are financed, but not necessarily balanced; operating budgets are 
balanced.‖). 
 
127
 Id. (―The federal government does not have a full-scale capital budgeting process. 
Funding for most federal capital assets is provided in annual appropriations under 
discretionary caps.‖). 
 
128
 Sherle R. Schwenninger, A Capital Budget for Public Investment, NEW AM., 61, 
available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/NAF_10big_Ideas_10.pdf (―Indeed, the 
federal budget does not even officially distinguish between spending on productivity-
enhancing investment and spending on current consumption. As a result, the federal 
government currently does not adequately fund investment in our nation‘s physical 
infrastructure of knowledge capital upon which a more productive economy rests.‖); see also 
Michael Moynihan, Investing in Our Common Future: U.S. Infrastructure, NDN, Nov. 13, 
2007, http://ndn.org/paper/2007/us-infrastructure. 
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After natural disasters strike, policy makers are generally quick to 
respond to calls for rebuilding, knowing that this type of spending is quite 
different from other types of government spending projects, yet they are 
also mindful that such rebuilding projects can themselves veer from being 
necessary and productive spending into becoming opportunities for 
wasteful and even corruption-riddled spending. What is missing is a 
mechanism by which we could ensure that a capital account would not 
present too great a temptation for political actors, who — it seems likely — 
would attempt to move many dubious items from the operating budget onto 
the capital budget, thus obscuring the wasteful nature of some government 
spending during such rebuilding efforts.
129
 
More deeply, the concern is that it might not be possible to identify a 
principled approach to capital budgeting that would reliably separate true 
investments from the remainder of government spending. The general 
problem, therefore, is in determining the relative costs and benefits of 
various potential government spending programs. Unfortunately, ―[i]n the 
world of infrastructure, cost-benefit analysis is still a science of the 
future.‖
130
 Any attempt to draw lines, even in a world without crass 
political opportunism, could thus fail to achieve the goal of identifying 
those spending projects — and only those spending projects — that 
contribute to the long-run growth of the U.S. economy and that therefore 
can be financed through deficit spending without compromising the long-
term prosperity of the American people.
131
 
The arguments against having the federal government adopt capital 
budgeting are thus ultimately prudential, based on the belief that it is simply 
unwise to trust Congress with such a powerful tool for justifying deficit 
spending.
132
 With a capital budget available, the argument goes, any silly 
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 See Moynihan, supra note 128 (―A National Infrastructure Bank would give public 
authorities means to capitalize federal investment in new infrastructure projects. It would 
also create a new center of knowledge and expertise on infrastructure with the ability to 
intermediate between the public and investors. On the other hand, concentrating 
responsibility for federal infrastructure finance in a bank might reduce the flexibility of some 
agencies (and the authority of some congressional committee chairmen).‖). 
 
130
 David Leonhardt, A Stimulus With Merit, And Misses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009,  
at B1. 
 
131
 June E. O‘Neill, Dir. Cong. Budget Office, on Capital Budgeting Before the 
President‟s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting (April 24, 1998), http://www. 
cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=440&type=0 [hereinafter 1998 CBO Study] (―Substituting annual 
depreciation for full acquisition cost in the budget, therefore, would displace an objective 
measure with a subjective one, whose imprecise character would make it a convenient target 
for manipulation and distortion.‖). 
 
132
 See id. 
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expenditure can be slipped into the federal budget and camouflaged as 
capital spending. The entire process, this argument continues, would be 
open to abuse and gamesmanship.
133
 Indeed, former President Clinton drew 
fire from the nation‘s English teachers (who, it must be noted, are not 
typically a force in national politics) when he attempted to describe some 
spending policies as ―investments,‖ taking third place in the 1993 
Doublespeak Awards because of his use of ―the word ‗investment‘ as a 
substitute for the word ‗spending‘ in his rhetoric on economic policy.‖
134
 
While it is certainly possible to over-use the word ―investment,‖ the 
English teachers simply had their accounting wrong. The choice is not 
between spending and investment, but between investment spending and 
consumption spending. If we view government as having to choose between 
the two, then our goal should not be to prevent politicians from using the 
term ―investment,‖ but rather to ensure that they use it correctly. 
This is an especially apt example of the aphorism that we should not let 
the perfect be the enemy of the good. That is, we should not allow the 
difficulties of creating a complete system that could flawlessly classify 
every investment project on the capital account (and all other projects on 
the operating account) to prevent us from identifying the relatively easy 
cases where a spending project is almost certainly an investment in future 
prosperity. Because perfection is impossible, any type of real-world capital 
accounting system should certainly have as a default position that any 
spending project is presumptively on the operating account. Yet there 
should be a mechanism to allow items to be moved onto a capital account. 
As discussed below, that mechanism could include simple legislative action 
on an item-by-item basis, or it could involve the harnessing of technical 
expertise through either an independent agency (for example, a budget 
agency modeled along the lines of the Federal Reserve) or through quasi-
judicial decision-making in an adversarial process.
135
 
C.  Capital Budgeting, the Golden Rule, and Growth Budgeting 
Because it is so difficult to determine whether expenditures will have 
long-term payoffs to the economy, it is a common short-hand to view 
government purchases of physical items (buildings, roads, etc.) as 
investments (and thus on the capital account) and its other purchases as 
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 See, e.g., Karen Pennar, Beware of Accounting Magic Tricks, Mr. Clinton, BUS. 
WK., Jan. 18, 1993, at 55. 
 
134
 Jan Ackerman, Forked Tongues Prevail on High; Pentagon Gets Annual 
Doublespeak Award from Teachers Group, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1993, at B-1. 
 
135
 See infra Part III.B. 
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consumption (and thus operating expenditures).
136
 While the logic of this is 
appealing, it omits some of the most important items on which the 
government spends money. 
For example, when the government funds basic research, it does not 
buy a physical item but wishes to buy something that will provide long-
term returns to the economy. Spending on all levels of education, on 
medical care, and on nutrition programs all offer the promise of long-term 
payoffs that could exceed borrowing costs.
137
 
The key is not to maximize the purchase of physical infrastructure but 
to choose the physical and intangible investments that will provide the 
greatest benefit to future citizens. This goes beyond simply arguing in favor 
of adopting a system of capital budgeting. It also suggests that even 
balancing an operating budget is not sufficient. 
Balancing the operating account while borrowing to finance items on 
the capital account, sometimes called the Golden Rule of Budgeting,
138
 
actually allows the government to waste resources if it is able to raise the 
taxes to do so. This should be unacceptable, because it would represent a 
direct transfer from the politically voiceless to those who benefit from the 
wasteful spending. Instead, the government‘s decisions should always 
include considerations of whether those decisions are helpful to the current 
and future health of the economy. 
Because of the common tendency to refer only to physical capital when 
discussing capital budgeting, I have coined the term ―growth budgeting‖ to 
make clear that the purpose is to choose those expenditures that will 
increase future growth, not to spend money on ―capital‖ only in its narrower 
physical meaning. 
D.  Some Examples: Investing in Children 
A good example of the kind of analysis that should be brought into a 
 
 
136
 In the U.S. federal government‘s National Income and Product Accounts, 
government spending is divided into consumption expenditures and gross investment. See 
Bruce E. Baker & Pamela A. Kelly, A Primer on BEA‟s Government Accounts, SURV. OF 
CURRENT BUS., Mar. 2008, at 32 (―Gross investment is the value of investment in structures, 
equipment, and software.‖). 
 
137
 Indeed, even short of these intangible items, a decision rule that simply puts the 
label of ―capital investment‖ on anything made with concrete can impoverish the future. ―[A 
sensible spending plan would] help cover the budget shortfalls of public transit systems, 
instead of simply allocating another $30 billion for the construction of new highways.‖ 
Leonhardt, supra note 130. 
 
138
 See also Bassetto, supra note 112; cf. Malcolm Sawyer, On Budget Deficits and 
Capital Expenditures 3 (The Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 208, 1997). 
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Growth Budgeting regime concerns expenditures on early childhood 
education programs. A number of careful studies have been undertaken 
over the last several decades to determine whether spending on the 
education of very young children pays dividends to society.
139
 The theory is 
that catching children (especially at-risk children) early and giving them 
extensive help in learning how to learn will increase the likelihood of 
success throughout their lives, reducing the costs of special education, 
prisons, etc.
140
 
The question is whether those investments actually pay off, and by how 
much. An assessment of several such studies shows that estimated rates of 
return on investments in early childhood education are extremely high, with 
estimated benefit/cost ratios (in present value terms) ranging from 2.36 in 
one study to 17.1 in another.
141
 Because a ratio of 1.0 implies that (properly 
measured) costs equal (properly measured) benefits, a ratio of 2.36 means 
that every dollar spent results in $2.36 of benefits, while a ratio of 17.1 
means that every dollar spent results in $17.10 in benefits.
142
 Passing up 
these future benefits in the name of safeguarding the future (through deficit 
reduction) is nonsensical. 
Other researchers have found equally promising results for investments 
in young children. For example, a summary of studies by two economists 
showed that ―[o]n productivity grounds alone, it appears to make sound 
business sense to invest in young children from disadvantaged 
environments. An accumulating body of evidence suggests that early 
childhood interventions are much more effective than remedies that attempt 
to compensate for early neglect later in life.‖
143
 
Similarly, recent research has shown that, even after children enter the 
 
 
139
 See e.g., JIM SAXTON, JOINT ECON. COMM., INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION: PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC RETURNS (2010), http://www.house.gov/jec/educ.htm (concluding that 
investment in education provides enormous social and economic benefit and noting ―[t]here 
is a strong consensus among economists that formal education is an important determinant of 
individual earnings as well as economic growth‖). 
 
140
 Julia B. Isaacs, Cost-Effective Investments in Children, in BUDGETING FOR 
NATIONAL PRIORITIES 1, 4 (The Brookings Institution ed., 2007) (―A large research literature 
has documented many positive effects of preschool programs, including greater school 
readiness and higher educational attainment, as well as reduced criminal activity and 
increased employment as an adolescent and adult.‖). 
 
141
 Id. at 6 tbl.2. 
 
142
 See id. 
 
143
 James J. Heckman & Dimitriy V. Masterov, The Productivity Argument for 
Investing in Young Children, 1 (Invest in Kids Working Grp., Comm. for Econ. Dev., 
Working Paper No. 5, 2004), available at http://www.ced.org/images/library/reports/ 
education/early_education/ivk/summary_heckman.pdf. 
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school system, the benefits of their earliest experiences show up later in 
life: 
Students who had learned much more in kindergarten were more 
likely to go to college than students with otherwise similar 
backgrounds. Students who learned more were also less likely to 
become single parents. As adults, they were more likely to be 
saving for retirement. Perhaps most striking, they were earning 
more.
144
 
The results showed that ―a standout kindergarten teacher is worth about 
$320,000 a year. That‘s the present value of the additional money that a full 
class of students can expect to earn over their careers.‖
145
 Moreover, this 
analysis focuses only on the economic returns to education, meaning that it 
does not ―take into account social gains, like better health and less 
crime.‖
146
 
In short, by using existing techniques, it is possible to determine the 
long-term payoff from at least some public spending. In the case of early 
childhood education, the returns vastly exceed the costs, making such 
spending a good investment in future wealth (to say nothing of the human 
impact of better educational outcomes). The question is how to use that 
information in a way that can improve the budgeting process, without 
opening up the budget to abuse. 
E.  The Advantages of Piecemeal Decision-Making 
The standard analysis of capital budgeting, as in the Golden Rule 
approach noted above, involves an assessment of the entire government 
budget‘s effect on economic growth.
147
 We assess whether the 
government‘s investment spending will pay net dividends, and we are thus 
able to say whether aggregate public investment is above or below the 
optimal level. As a theoretical exercise, this approach is sensible, but for 
actual policy making, this approach biases decisions against public 
spending by tying the fate of clearly advantageous investments to our 
ability to determine the payoffs of all other possible investments. Since that 
has never been accomplished, the exercise might wrongly be abandoned in 
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the belief that the information required to make any smart investments is 
unavailable. 
We can avoid this tendency by changing the focus of analysis from 
whether we are spending the optimal total amount on public investments to 
whether any particular project has long-term payoffs. Given that we know, 
for example, that early childhood education programs have a high rate of 
return, there is no reason to hold spending on such a sure winner hostage to 
our limited knowledge about other budget items. Such a piecemeal 
approach thus allows us to move items onto the Growth Budget on a case-
by-case basis, leaving some potentially valuable projects unfunded, but at 
least including in the Growth Budget those projects about which we have 
reason to feel especially confident. Being wrong or uncertain about one 
policy need not cause us to be wrong when estimating the effects of other 
policies. 
V.  FISCAL DISCIPLINE THROUGH AGENCY ACTION 
Given the great promise of a Growth Budget, it is necessary to consider 
the possible ways in which such a new approach to federal budget 
accounting could go awry. Perhaps the most obvious problem, as noted 
above, is the temptation for politicians to move unworthy items onto the 
Growth Budget for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the 
projects at hand. Any system that implicitly makes some projects less 
expensive than others — by allowing them to be financed through 
borrowing rather than taxing — invites predictable abuses of the political 
process, fed by lobbying, localized interests, and so on.
148
 
The ultimate goal of this exercise is to allow the federal government to 
proceed to make at least some of the easier calls in its spending decisions, 
without continually being stymied by the impossibility of creating an ideal 
accounting system. Before turning to that concern, however, it is important 
to acknowledge some possible objections to this proposal that are beyond 
the framework of the present analysis. 
A.  Rejecting the Growth Budget Out of Hand 
As a theoretical matter, the general notion of capital budgeting (and the 
specific proposal here for adopting a Growth Budget) might seem almost 
too simple. It is, after all, nothing more than an applied version of cost-
benefit analysis. As such, it is subject to the same concerns that apply to all 
cost-benefit analyses, including whether we have taken all costs and 
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benefits into account, the quality of our data, and the framework for turning 
those data into estimated payoffs. Still, it might appear that one could not 
reasonably oppose the adoption of a Growth Budget from a theoretical 
standpoint, leaving open for discussion only what to include in a Growth 
Budget and how to determine what will be included in that budget. 
There are, however, three possible reasons that one could reject out of 
hand the need to consider adopting any kind of capital budgeting. First, one 
could believe as an empirical matter that there are simply no examples of 
any kind of government spending that has long-term payoffs. While this is 
logically the same thing as saying that an item-by-item analysis will result 
in no projects being added to the Growth Budget, one might start from the 
position that there is a nonrebuttable presumption that government spending 
is always inferior to private spending. 
Second, one could believe that some proposed government programs 
might indeed offer long-term payoffs but that those financial benefits are 
offset by the very fact that funding such programs would cause the 
government to grow and intrude further into people‘s lives.
149
 In short, the 
cost of public investment is always greater than the benefit of public 
investment because the growth of government is simply too much of a 
threat to personal freedom. 
The third objection that one might raise to abandoning the current 
system and adopting the Growth Budget is that the risks and costs of such a 
new accounting system are simply too high.
150
 Even if there are some 
projects that could be funded without abusing personal freedoms and with 
high promised returns, the costs and risks of switching to a new and 
untested system make it not worth the experiment. The creation of any new 
federal agencies and procedures might well impose long-term costs on 
society that would overwhelm any projected gains from projects on the 
Growth Budget. 
The analysis in this article does not directly engage with these three 
objections. The presumptions here are that there might be some spending 
projects that only the government can or will undertake, that those projects 
might be superior in terms of creating economic growth than the private 
spending (if any) that they indirectly replace, that there is nothing unique to 
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such government programs that makes them a threat to freedom or 
democracy, and that the administrative costs of adopting and running the 
Growth Budget are presumptively smaller than the net returns on the 
projects that would otherwise not be financed. All but one of those 
presumptions is ultimately subject to empirical verification, which is either 
implicit in the analysis here (such as the identification of early childhood 
education programs as high-payoff spending projects) or is beyond the 
scope of the present article. The untestable presumption, regarding the 
dangers of what is usually called Big Government, is a matter of political 
philosophy that is also outside the scope of this analysis. 
In short, the analysis in this paper proceeds by setting aside potentially 
valid objections to the very idea of starting down the road to separating 
government spending into consumption and investment. Even for those who 
are willing to set aside those objections, however, several serious obstacles 
remain before one can confidently believe that the Growth Budget would 
improve our long-term economic prospects. 
B.  Using and Abusing Capital Accounts 
The primitive nature of current budget practices is, to anyone with even 
a rudimentary knowledge of accounting principles, unsettling. 
In the current system, the federal government sends money to 
states without any real effort to evaluate whether it will pay for 
worthy projects. States rarely do serious analyses of their own. 
They build new roads before fixing old ones. They don‘t consider 
whether those new roads will lead to faster traffic or simply more 
traffic. They spend millions of dollars on legislators‘ pet projects 
and hulking new sports stadiums.
151
 
At best, we are inching toward a system with a few small attempts to bring 
rigor to the budgeting process. ―At least one version of the [2009 stimulus] 
bill also sets aside $5.5 billion to be awarded by the transportation 
secretary, supposedly on the merits of a project.‖
152
 
The existing system, therefore, is ripe for improvement through the 
adoption of even the most minimally competent budgeting procedures. The 
legitimate concern, however, is that we can go too far in the other direction, 
by creating an opportunity to move spending into the Growth Budget 
without any reasonable checks on how that is done. While it hardly 
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stretches the imagination to suspect that members of Congress do not 
always act in accordance with pure economic theory, it is simply not true 
that a capital budgeting process must automatically be an open cookie jar. 
Accounting standards have existed for decades and have been adapted to 
various types of government activities.
153
 Government and private entities 
do, of course, sometimes play at the edges of these rules, but the very fact 
that accounting-related mismanagement comes to light and is treated as a 
problem arises from the presumption that those rules are otherwise 
generally being followed. Even if enforcement is imperfect, there is no 
reason to presume that the system must necessarily be open to rampant 
abuse. Even an irregularly enforced speed limit will generally result in 
slower traffic than no speed limit at all. 
Moreover, the current federal system effectively treats all expenditures 
as if they were operating expenses.
154
 While it is possible to adopt a capital 
or growth budget and then to implement it incorrectly, not to implement it 
guarantees that the government‘s budget is measured incorrectly.
155
 It also 
leads to poor policy choices. If the only goal is to balance the budget, 
cutting projects with valuable long-term payoffs looks just as good as 
cutting purely wasteful spending. It even becomes ―desirable‖ to sell public 
assets at a loss, since any revenues proceeding from those sales reduce the 
annual deficit. 
Separating government spending into investment and consumption, 
therefore, has at least two desirable effects. First, it would prevent 
policymakers from cutting programs that are likely to provide long-term 
benefits to the economy. For example, to prove their fiscal responsibility, 
the leadership of the House of Representatives several years ago wanted to 
cut funding for mass transit, because they ―see transportation projects as 
one of the first ways to cut back the budget and reduce the deficit.‖
156
 
While it is plausible that some mass transit projects would not provide 
long-term payoffs, others surely would. For present purposes, the assertion 
is simply that there are likely to be some projects that would qualify for the 
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Growth Budget, and it would thus be wise to identify them and to pay for 
them, even from borrowed funds. At the very least, it remains to be proven 
that the political gamesmanship that would exist under a system of capital 
budgeting would necessarily be worse for the economy than our current 
system. 
The second advantage of adopting a capital budget for the federal 
government is that it would penetrate the category commonly known as 
―pork-barrel‖ spending. The operative definition currently seems to be that 
pork is anything that directly benefits a specific legislator‘s constituents: 
―Relatively little of the extra spending [in a 2007 supplemental budget 
request] is targeted to lawmakers‘ home districts — a precondition for 
labeling something pork.‖
157
 For example, the late Senator Robert Byrd (D., 
W. Va.), proudly described himself as the ―Prince of Pork‖ for his ability to 
direct federal projects into his home state.
158
 Among his successes: 
There are two Robert C. Byrd United States Courthouses, four 
Robert C. Byrd stretches of highway, freeway, expressway and 
drive, and a Robert C. Byrd Bridge. And two Robert C. Byrd 
Interchanges to reach these valuable amenities. There is the Robert 
C. Byrd Lifelong Learning Center, the Robert C. Byrd Hardwood 
Technology Center, the Robert C. Byrd Health and Wellness 
Center, and the Robert C. Byrd Institute for Advanced Flexible 
Manufacturing.
159
 
Similarly, the advocacy group Citizens Against Government Waste 
makes a practice of itemizing what it views as ―waste‖ in government 
spending projects. In one recent report, the group identified some of ―the 
most egregious earmarks,‖ including such items as $94.1 million for ―Levee 
work (California),‖ $425 million for ―Education grants for rural areas,‖ $4 
million for ―Office of Women‘s Health at Food and Drug Administration,‖ 
$969.65 million for ―Influenza pandemic preparedness,‖ and $1.25 billion 
for ―Public housing agencies.‖
160
 While it is possible that each of those 
items is actually wasteful (either in their entirety or by being funded too 
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generously in light of their long-term payoff), at least their descriptions 
suggest projects that could be classified as capital spending projects. An 
essential goal in creating the Growth Budget would be to move beyond 
superficial labels and identify the valuable projects, to save them from a 
thoughtlessly wielded budget ax. 
C.  Can Budget Abuses be Disciplined by the Political Process? 
Adopting a system of Growth Budgeting would open up a wide array 
of possible spending decisions that could be described as public 
investments. For any proposed spending program, it is at least plausible to 
imagine an argument that the economy will grow faster if that project is 
funded. (Such arguments would, however, be subject to the kind of cost-
benefit accounting discussed in this article.) It is, however, possible that the 
political process, for all its faults, will do a reasonably good job of 
determining when spending is worth it and when it is not. This seems more 
likely for some categories of spending than for others. 
1. Difficult Calls: War and Growth Budgeting 
For example, spending that is related to the military generally has much 
broader support than spending that benefits the poor and the socially 
marginalized. While there is a colorable argument that expenditures for 
carrying out wars should be subject to the same analysis that we apply to 
spending on bridges, schools, nutrition, and so on, the high stakes in wars 
make it difficult even to fathom a cost-benefit analysis that would satisfy 
broadly held notions of what should count as worthwhile military spending. 
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice justified the cost of military 
operations in Iraq along such lines: ―There have been plenty of markers that 
show that this is a country that is worth the investment, because once it 
emerges as a country that is a stabilising factor, you will have a very 
different kind of Middle East.‖
161
 
Such arguments may well be valid, as are even broader arguments that 
we must be willing to pay any price to defeat an enemy and protect our very 
way of life.
162
 As one economist put it: ―When it comes to judging whether 
war is worth it, however, cost-benefit analysis is little more than educated 
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guessing by other means. But at least it provides a framework for where to 
put the guesses.‖
163
 
Determining the net costs of war is not merely intractable analytically, 
but, as noted above, it is the kind of decision that is virtually certain to be 
handled directly (if not necessarily well) by the political process. If we 
decide to go to war without raising taxes, then we are implicitly deciding 
that the war is a capital expenditure. If we decide to raise taxes to pay for 
war, then we are either saying that it is not worth it to finance the war 
through debt or that we are willing to sacrifice even more now, despite the 
benefits that fighting and winning the war will bestow on future 
generations. 
Indeed, it seems likely that some types of spending are approved too 
frequently (in a cost-benefit sense) because of their political popularity. 
While troubling, that category of spending is irrelevant for the current 
analysis, because popular spending is already being undertaken. Growth 
budgeting, as envisioned here, is a process that opens up the possibility of 
justifying spending that would otherwise not be approved, and it does so 
only after passing muster on a cost-benefit basis. The Growth Budget 
should pave the way for approval of high-payoff projects that would not 
otherwise have been undertaken. 
2. Independent Analysts and Official Estimates 
The failure to finance projects that have highly promising payoffs 
might be a problem of information rather than a failure of governance. One 
could imagine that Congress might simply be acting in the dark, and if 
some light were to shine on the investment opportunities that it misses each 
year, it would readily fund those projects. 
The evidence to date, however, suggests that there is no shortage of 
research available regarding a wide range of such missed opportunities.
164
 
There appear to be many worthwhile investments that have been regularly 
ignored,
165
 which raises the question of why legislators are not acting on 
 
 
163
 Alan B. Krueger, The Cost of Invading Iraq: Imponderables Meet Uncertainties, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at C3. 
 
164
 See, e.g., William T. Dickens, et al., The Effects of Investing in Early Education on 
Economic Growth, Policy Brief #153, The Brookings Institution, April 2006; see also Isaacs, 
note 140. 
 
165
 Elizabeth Kolbert, Uncomfortable Science, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010 
(discussing Congress‘ failure to move forward with the Waxman-Markey bill and noting, 
―Not content merely to ignore the science, [Republicans] have decided to go after the 
scientists‖). 
BUCHANAN.FORMATTED.8 (FOR ONLINE EDITION ONLY) 8/31/2011  10:42 AM 
124 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  31:75 
 
the available evidence. One possibility is that the sources of those analyses 
are of unknown quality and independence. In the cacophony of issue 
advocacy in the halls of government, it might simply be too time-
consuming and contentious to figure out which research reports can be 
believed and which should be ignored. 
This raises the prospect that the government could clarify matters by 
designating an agency that would produce reports on the long-term payoffs 
of various investment projects, both by carrying out independent research 
and by assessing the research carried out by nongovernmental analysts. 
Congress could act on those pronouncements even if there were no 
obligation to do so. 
To a certain degree, this is already done. The Congressional Budget 
Office
166
 and the Office of Management and Budget
167
 provide budgetary 
analyses for Congress and the Executive branch, respectively, and statistical 
agencies within various cabinet departments provide useful assessments of 
government projects.
168
 Even if an official stamp of approval on budget 
analyses could overcome the credibility problem (so long as the budget 
analysts themselves maintain a reputation for independence and honesty), at 
the very least it would seem necessary to designate one agency as the 
source of official estimates of the payoffs of potential public investment 
projects. 
If there were a credible government source that determined the most 
worthwhile spending projects, that agency could take on the role of 
providing a sort of public shaming function. An analogy would be to the 
Treasury Department‘s annual computation of ―tax expenditures,‖
169
 which 
purport to show how the government has used the tax system to provide the 
equivalent of direct spending on various politically favored items (such as 
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owner-occupied housing, charitable contributions, etc.).
170
 If an official 
agency were to use the Growth Budget to expose the high-payoff items that 
Congress has failed to fund, it could potentially create some pressure to 
fund those projects. 
Additional pressure in the right direction could come from requiring 
that official announcements of fiscal deficits be adjusted downward for the 
amount of public investment. Doing this would not directly require 
Congress to fund any specific items, but it would mean that when Congress 
approved an item that would be deemed public investment, the announced 
deficit would not rise. 
Each of these ideas at least moves the process in the right direction, by 
providing information and incentives that would increase public investment. 
Nonetheless, there are stronger measures that could be used to make it even 
more likely that productive investments would not be overlooked. 
D.  Administrative Procedures 
There are a number of possible ways to use administrative processes to 
bring some of the benefits of the Growth Budget to federal spending 
decisions. The discussion that follows assesses several possibilities and 
concludes that the best available approach would be to create a Growth 
Budgeting Board (GBB), which would be empowered to determine which 
spending projects would be included on a federal growth budget and would 
thus not be counted in official deficit estimates. The other possibilities also 
have their appealing features, as discussed below, but they ultimately seem 
less promising than something along the lines sketched out for the GBB. 
1. A Quasi-Judicial Process 
Perhaps the most far-reaching and detailed approach to assessing the 
investment potential of various spending programs would be to create a 
process modeled on administrative law courts. Under such a system, the 
federal government could set up ―budget courts‖ that would be empowered 
to determine whether a spending project should be added to the Growth 
Budget. Such a system would have the advantages of any adversarial 
process, allowing proponents of a spending plan to try to prove that the 
project would provide long-term benefits, while opponents of the plan 
would attempt to disprove such claims. 
 
 
170
 Tax expenditure analysis has been the subject of intense criticism. See Clifford 
Fleming & Robert Peroni, Nice Try, Joint Tax Committee, (2008) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
BUCHANAN.FORMATTED.8 (FOR ONLINE EDITION ONLY) 8/31/2011  10:42 AM 
126 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  31:75 
 
Although such a system draws on many of the best parts of the modern 
administrative state, the creation and administration of such a system 
presents challenges that should discourage even the most ardent advocate of 
the adversarial system. To begin, it is not clear who would have standing to 
argue in favor of or against any specific proposal. Presumably, members of 
Congress could argue on both sides, but there might well be instances in 
which no member of Congress would find it worthwhile to oppose a 
particular item‘s inclusion in the Growth Budget, as well as the likelihood 
of quid pro quos whereby members would agree not to challenge each 
other‘s favored projects. It would be possible to grant standing to interested 
parties who study these issues, such as the various government watchdog 
groups that currently issue public information about government spending 
and waste, but there is no obvious way to limit the pool of potential litigants 
in a principled way. 
In addition to standing, these administrative law courts would need 
rules of evidence and standards of proof to apply in their decisions. 
Congress, in enabling legislation, could specify these rules up to a point, 
and there is at least some likelihood that a consensus of best practices 
would emerge relatively quickly in these cases. Even so, if there were more 
than one administrative law judge hearing these cases, there would be a 
distinct possibility of inconsistent decisions. 
Ultimately, an administrative law approach to growth budgeting seems 
unwieldy and expensive. It is thus unnecessary to explore these and related 
technical issues, such as how judges would be selected for such a system, 
the standards and venue for appeals, etc. Suffice it to say that any system of 
this sort would be likely to founder on the administrative complexity 
involved. Because of its inherent complexity, moreover, the administrative 
law approach would also be likely to fail to provide timely decisions. If 
Congress needs decisions quickly, a quasi-judicial process seems the least 
appropriate way to proceed. 
Despite the flaws of a system of administrative courts, such a system is 
useful to consider because of the light it sheds on the other possible 
approaches discussed below. Were it not for its high transaction costs 
(broadly defined), the administrative law approach would have much to 
recommend it. The more workable alternatives should at least offer the 
possibility of capturing some of the advantages that are gained from 
evidence-based decision-making by qualified decision makers. 
2. Blue-Ribbon Commissions 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from administrative courts, in 
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terms of institutional complexity, are Congressionally mandated expert 
commissions. The federal government has previously set up, in addition to 
simple fact-finding commissions, expert commissions that provide 
Congress with reports that require legislative action. The most famous of 
these in recent memory was the commission that drew up a list of military 
bases that would be closed under a broad consolidation plan to reduce 
spending on facilities that had outlived their usefulness.
171
 The commission 
was not directly empowered to close any bases, but Congress agreed in 
advance that its proposals would be voted as a single slate.
172
 This was 
designed to get around the problem of special pleading, in which every 
member of Congress had an incentive to fight to keep open the facilities in 
her state or district, and no other member found it worthwhile to fight 
against a motivated colleague.
173
 
The base-closing commission has generally been hailed as a success, 
and it certainly provides a model for possible action.
174
 Recently, a member 
of Congress proposed a similar type of commission to ―look at the tax code 
and the array of entitlement programs and produce a set of 
recommendations . . . to put them on a fiscally sustainable course.‖
175
 This 
proposal has not been enacted, but it suggests that there is concern that 
Congress‘s normal processes will never produce needed reforms of the tax 
code, Medicare, etc. 
This type of commission, however, seems ill-suited to deal with the 
issues that motivate a call to adopt growth budgeting. The issues considered 
by the base-closing commission or the proposed tax and entitlements 
commission, even though they arise on a continuous basis, can be handled 
periodically. That is, while one could imagine having a base-closing 
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commission that issued reports every year, it is also relatively harmless to 
have the commission do its work once and go out of existence until and 
unless Congress decides to go through the process again. A full-scale 
rewriting of the tax code could also be a one-time (or at least occasional) 
exercise. 
By contrast, the annual budgeting process is always filled with 
decisions about whether some items could have long-term payoffs; so it 
would seem wise to create a system that is ongoing rather than ad hoc. If 
such a commission were to become a permanent part of the budget process, 
however, it would cease to be a ―commission‖ in the sense in which that 
term is often used.
176
 Instead, it would become an administrative agency of 
the sort discussed below. 
3. The Fiscal Fed 
Where adjudicative processes are inappropriate, and where political 
decision-making is possibly tainted, agency decision-making based on 
professional expertise is often the best alternative. Congress could create a 
system for determining fiscal policy that is politically insulated, that draws 
on the best available knowledge, and that employs trained decision makers. 
Indeed, Congress did just that for monetary policy when it created the 
Federal Reserve System in 1913.
177
 Although the Fed‘s actions can be 
reversed through legislation — indeed, the Fed itself can be abolished by 
legislation — it has been delegated complete authority in determining 
monetary policy.
178
 
It would be possible for Congress to do the same with fiscal policy, 
creating a so-called Fiscal Fed to take over policy-making with regarding to 
government spending and taxation. Using the Fed itself as a model, or 
developing an alternative, one could imagine a system in which Congress 
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 Matthew Eric Glassman, Cong. Research Serv., Congressional Commissions: 
Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations, 2–4 (2008), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40076_20081219.pdf (―While no legal definition exists for 
what constitutes a ‗congressional commission,‘ in this report a congressional commission is 
defined as a multi-member independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists 
temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by Members 
of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress.‖). 
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 See generally Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (1913) (establishing the 
federal reserve system); see also Gyung-Ho Jeong et al., Political Compromise and 
Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 52 J.L. & 
ECON. 472, 476–82 (2009) (discussing the Federal Reserve‘s insulation from political 
influence). 
 
178
 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522. 
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delegates its authority over fiscal policy to a board of experts.
179
 Such a 
move would remove from Congress‘s direct authority decisions that might 
better be handled by experts who are not worried about raising funds for 
their re-election campaigns. 
The most obvious reason to suspect that Congress would never agree to 
create such an agency is that much of its power and influence derives from 
its power of the purse. If one goal of a Representative or a Senator is to be 
re-elected, and if the electoral system will continue to require fund-raising, 
it is easy to see why Congress would not want to create a Fiscal Fed. 
Moreover, even a legislator whose motives went beyond political survival 
could sincerely argue that decisions about taxing and spending should not 
be isolated from the political process. One could readily believe that the 
value of representative democracy would be seriously diluted if only 
noneconomic issues were the subject of direct congressional action. 
4. The Growth Budgeting Board (GBB) 
Fortunately, the advantages of agency decision-making can be 
harnessed for the purposes identified in this article without a wholesale 
abdication by Congress of its fiscal policy-making powers. A ―miniature‖ 
Fiscal Fed, with responsibility only over identifying the short-run and long-
run spending that can be financed by deficits, would still leave Congress 
with ample responsibilities in setting fiscal policy — determining the level 
and content of spending, the level of tax receipts, the design of the tax code, 
etc. 
This mini-Fiscal Fed, which could be called the Growth Budgeting 
Board, could be empowered to carry out two basic functions: (1) to identify 
when short-run changes in government deficits can be designated as anti-
recessionary, allowing such deficits to be created for a limited period of 
time, and (2) to gather evidence regarding spending projects that might 
finance worthy long-term investments and that should be put on a growth 
budget. This centralized process would allow the board‘s members to make 
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 The constitutionality of such a plan could be in doubt. Some argue, in fact, that the 
Fed itself was an unconstitutional delegation of authority. See, e.g., Ashvin Pandurangi, How 
Did A Single Unconstitutional Agency Become The Most Powerful Organization In 
America?, BusinessInsider, Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/fed-is-    
unconstitutional-2010-11 (―The most powerful, influential economic policy-making 
institution in the country, the Federal Reserve (‗Fed‘), is an unelected body that is 
completely unaccountable to the people. Well, let‘s back up and start with the fact that this 
institution‘s very existence is most likely unconstitutional.‖); Bill Denman, THE AM. VIEW 
BLOG (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.theamericanview.com/forums/showthread.php?t=299  
(explaining why, in his view, the Federal Reserve Board is not constitutional). 
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group decisions about whether financing a project through borrowing would 
be advantageous to future growth. 
Congress has, in fact, already at least talked about creating some type 
of administrative agency to deal with a few aspects of annual budgeting 
decisions, including consideration of a so-called ―infrastructure bank.‖ 
The [2009 stimulus] bill could create a small-scale version of an 
―infrastructure bank,‖ a free-standing entity that could make more 
merit-based decisions than Congress does (an idea that Mr. Obama 
supports). The bill could also finance the creation of new state 
offices to conduct cost-benefit analyses.
180
 
These discussions are apparently limited to infrastructure projects 
(which, as noted above, are only one sub-category of the universe of 
spending projects that could qualify for inclusion in the Growth Budget), 
but there is no reason why the concept could not be expanded. 
If Congress were to create a Growth Budgeting Board, it would need to 
decide whether the proposed agency‘s decisions would be advisory or 
would become law (possibly subject to an override process), but the most 
important step is to provide some rationality to the system. If a member of 
Congress, an industry group, or a public advocacy organization wanted the 
GBB to move a spending program to the Growth Budget, they would have 
to provide some meaningful evidence that the project would actually pay 
off. ―The current system is so inefficient that even a minimal amount of 
change would represent progress. If you want your project moved to the 
front of the line, you should have to come to Washington bearing hard 
data — not flimsy boosterism — about its economic and environmental 
benefits.‖
181
 
Perhaps the most important question in designing the GBB is the 
degree of certainty that it must find before determining that a spending item 
should be added to the Growth Budget. Should it use the fiscal equivalent 
of ―beyond a reasonable doubt,‖ or ―more likely than not,‖ or ―clear and 
convincing evidence‖? Because of the uncertainty associated with the state 
of the art in budget projections, and because there should be a presumption 
against allowing spending to be financed by borrowing, the standard should 
probably be set rather high — certainly high enough (say, a 75% or even a 
90% probability) that we would generally not borrow to pay for items that 
do not justify their financing costs. 
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 David Leonhardt, Piling Up Monuments of Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at 
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Even with a strong presumption against categorizing a project as public 
investment, however, this would still be an improvement over the current 
situation. Some ―low-hanging fruit,‖ such as the early childhood education 
programs noted above, should easily clear any hurdle and be approved for 
the Growth Budget. Those easy decisions alone could more than justify the 
effort. 
E.  Pre-Screening and Post Mortem Assessments 
An administrative decision-making process along the lines of the 
proposed Growth Budgeting Board would have the ability both to pre-
screen projects for possible inclusion in the Growth Budget (that is, to issue 
advisory opinions) and to assess after the fact whether projects had actually 
paid off. Pre-screening would enhance the prospects of funding promising 
projects, by making them look ―less expensive‖ than if they were on the 
operating budget, meaning that Congress would not need to decide to, say, 
cut funds for cancer research in search of a balanced budget. 
Having a list of pre-screened public investment projects would be 
particularly helpful when Congress needs to fund economic stimulus. 
During the debate in early 2009 over the economic stimulus bill, one 
concern was that it would take too long to approve some public investment 
projects and begin to spend the money.
182
 The GBB could include in its 
assessments of possible spending projects the time line of spending entailed 
by each project, allowing Congress to determine whether the project fits 
into a reasonable time line. More important, simply having such a list 
would mean that there would be projects that have already been reasonably 
vetted and have been screened for inclusion in the Growth Budget, giving 
decision-makers the ability to move up the starting date on such projects. 
This would naturally dovetail with the Board‘s duty to identify when short-
run spending projects can be justified as anti-recessionary. 
Since part of the point of a growth budget is to determine whether we 
are spending money on projects with long-term payoffs or that provide only 
short-term consumption, the GBB could assess retrospectively whether its 
earlier decisions (positive and negative) have been correct. If an item was 
not approved for the Growth Budget but was funded anyway and turned out 
to produce growth, it would be possible to update the national accounts later 
to reflect that fact. Similarly, mistakes in the opposite direction would need 
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 Id. (―[I]t‘s important to remember why infrastructure has become a hot topic now. 
The economy already appears to be in its worst recession in a generation. Without a major 
stimulus package, it could get a lot worse next year. So now isn‘t the time to overhaul the 
entire system. Speed matters.‖). 
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to be corrected. In either case, this process of post-decision screening would 
allow Congress to determine whether to continue to fund projects that are 
already underway. 
While by no means the cure to all of our fiscal problems, the proposed 
Growth Budgeting Board could provide useful information for Congress to 
take into account in setting its budget. Much institutional detail obviously 
remains to be determined, but as a starting point, the GBB offers the 
promise of bringing needed professional expertise to the process of 
determining whether to spend money on short-run stimulus and on projects 
that offer potential long-term returns that could benefit us all in the future. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. government has, for almost eighty years, taken an active role 
in trying to end and reverse economic downturns, reflecting a commitment 
to maximize the economic well-being of its citizens in the short run. In 
addition, one of the core concerns of government budgeting is the impact 
that decisions to spend and tax today will have on living standards in the 
long run. Given the recent severe economic recession and its painful, 
ongoing aftermath, and given opportunities to spend government funds on 
projects with long-term benefits — such as cancer research, education at all 
levels, technology incubation, high-speed rail, advanced electrical grids, 
and so on — I propose that the U.S. federal government create a Growth 
Budgeting Board (GBB). The GBB would be empowered as an independent 
government agency, to guide government budgeting decisions in both the 
short run and the long run. 
In the short run, the GBB would identify spending that can be justified 
as a short-term response to an economic downturn, allowing the 
government to run ―good deficits‖ that would bring the economy back to 
health as quickly as possible. In addition, the GBB would adopt a variation 
on capital budgeting described herein as Growth Budgeting. Such an 
accounting system would permit the GBB to determine which projects 
provide no long-term benefits (and therefore must be financed by current 
taxation), and which projects can (because they will create benefits in the 
future that exceed borrowing costs) be financed through annual deficit 
spending. That is, it could identify ―good deficits‖ that raise long-run 
growth. Administered in a principled way, a Growth Budgeting system 
could result in higher future living standards, even when the government 
increases its outstanding debt each year. 
The potential danger in adopting a Growth Budget lies in its ability to 
make some spending projects appear to be less expensive than they actually 
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are. If an item is included on a capital budget, this frees legislators to 
approve the item without making the difficult choices necessary to fund a 
project from current revenues. Therefore, it is necessary to discipline this 
process by adopting safeguards to insure that the Growth Budget will 
include only items that are truly worthwhile long-term investments. After 
discussing a range of possible administrative systems that could prevent 
such abuse, ranging from one-time expert commissions to full-scale 
adjudicative processes, this article concludes that creating the proposed 
GBB would be the best method to discipline a Growth Budgeting system. 
The central messages of this article are that the federal government 
must continue to be actively involved in ending recessions, and that it is 
possible to adopt modern methods of budget accounting (already common 
in the private sector and in other governments) that will guide spending 
decisions away from waste and toward projects that will improve living 
standards, today and in the future. While there are many areas of reasonable 
disagreement over the administrative details involved in adopting the 
proposed reforms, those details should not prevent us from making concrete 
progress in our efforts to have the government spend responsibly, now and 
in the future. 
